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A N  
E X A M I N A T I O N  
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C o m m e r c i a l P r i n c i p l e s  
O F T H E L A T E  
N E G O T I A T I O N , & c .

I n M D C C L X I .

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# E R R A T A.

Page. Line.

- 4. 4. *for speak read speaks.*
- 11. 1. *for negotionable read negotiable.*
- 2 11. *for aad read and.*
- 24. 27. *for Ideas read Idea.*
- 31. 1. *for fa read far.*
- 48. 13. *for by Treaty read by the late Treaty,*
- 50. 24. *for Profit of read Profit upon.*
- 60. note *last line, dele to.*
- 66. note 1 line *for Leward read Windward.*
- 105. last line *dele also.*

AN  
EXAMINATION  
OF THE  
Commercial Principles  
OF THE LATE  
NEGOTIATION  
BETWEEN  
GREAT BRITAIN and FRANCE  
In MDCCLXI.

IN WHICH

The System of that Negotiation with Regard  
to our COLONIES and COMMERCE is considered.

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The SECOND EDITION.

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Aguntur certissima Populi Romani vestigalia et maxima, quibus amissis et pacis ornamenta et subsidia belli requiretis—  
Nam ceterarum provinciarum vestigalia, Quirites, tanta sunt, ut iis ad ipsas provincias tutandas vix contenti esse possimus.

Cic. *pro leg. Man.*

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A N  
E X A M I N A T I O N  
O F T H E  
Commercial Principles  
O F T H E  
N E G O T I A T I O N, &c,

**T**HERE is nothing either in the general Plan, or in the particular Provisions of the late Negotiation, which can be supposed, in the least Degree, binding in any future Treaty. This is sufficiently evident, not only from the express Agreement of the two Courts, but, even if there had been no such Agreement, from the very Nature of such imperfect Transactions. A Retrospect, however, to that Negotiation, may be attended with considerable Advantages. It may point out the Principles which then actuated our Administration, and may enable us to determine how far it will be consistent with our Interest, on a similar Occasion, to adopt or to reject that System of Pacification.

B

It

It is in my Opinion a fortunate Circumstance, notwithstanding the additional Expence which we have incurred since the Close of the late Negotiation, that we have still an Opportunity coolly and at Leisure to review, and, if it be not presumptuous, to rejudge the whole of that very interesting Transaction : because we are still in a Condition to make such a Revision of real Service to us. An Opportunity so favourable rarely occurs. Negotiations ordinarily remain involved in the prudential Obscurity, with which Deliberations of that Importance ought always to be attended, until they are finally ratified. The Business of political Criticism is then at an End. However just it may be, it is then certainly useless.

We are not, I hope, so far gone in Military Madness, as to look no farther than the War. We do not fight and conquer without some Consideration of the End and Purpose of our Victories, and our Acquisitions. Whilst the War continues our Object is simple ; it is only by every possible Means to weaken and distress the Enemy. The Business of Pacification is more difficult, as it is more important. We are then to form such Plans, and to pursue such Measures, as may be most conducive to the lasting, solid, and substantial Benefit of our Country. This is a Matter which requires the most mature Deliberation ; and therefore not only justifies, but demands the Intervention of every Person, according to the Sort of Knowledge

Knowledge he happens to possess; and calls for the publick Attention to every Proposal which seems to arise from any Appearance of publick Spirit, and to be supported by any tolerable Degree of Information.

We are still in the Train of Conquest; our Position and the Aspect of Things are continually varying; but notwithstanding these Variations, the general Plan of our Policy must be the same. Every Country has an Interest more particularly its own, resulting from those Circumstances, which constitute its peculiar Strength and Safety. The great Source of our particular Opulence and Power, has hitherto been considered to arise from Trade; and it would be an unfortunate Effect of all our Bravery and Policy, if we had either fought or negotiated ourselves out of our commercial Character. Advantages of a merely political Kind, will be always more or less problematical; their exact Value can hardly ever come to be estimated; and the political System is itself subject to such Fluctuation, that what at one Time we may have sought with infinite Eagerness, and bought at an enormous Expence, by a Change, owing perhaps to the Death or Deposition of a foreign Prince, to a Love Intrigue, to personal Resentment, or possibly to mere Inconstancy and Caprice in those who govern, may be rendered in a Moment insignificant or useless, and even sometimes dangerous. How was all *Europe* agitated,

almost within our own Memory, upon the Business of a Barrier for the *Dutch*? What Volumes were wrote upon that Subject, which no body now so much as speak of? *Holland* thought her very Being depended upon it; *Great Britain*, with her usual Warmth for all her Allies, was still more earnest than the Principal, and laboured this Work as the only Means of preserving the Liberties and Independence of *Europe*; *France* omitted nothing in her Power to prevent, to obstruct, or to frustrate the Design; and after all this mighty Bustle, it would at this time be hard to say, whether *Holland*, *Great Britain*, or *France*, concern themselves least about that Barrier, which once so intirely engrossed the whole Attention of them all. In reality, in every political Question the Passions are always more or less engaged, our Decisions upon such Questions are of Consequence less to be relied upon; let the Situation of Affairs change but a little, and our Ideas change with them.

But there is no Situation in which Wealth is not Strength, and in which Commerce is not Wealth. If Commerce is our Object, we *know*, and in all other Cases we can at best only guess, what we acquire. From the general Nature therefore of such Advantages, as well as from their Relation to our own more particular Interest, these should be Objects capital, and Conditions indispensable in every Scheme we form, every Conquest we propose, and every Negotiation we engage in.

In

In the Reign of Queen *Anne*, the Whigs and Tories mutually and justly censured each other, for that the one in the Treaty of *Gertruydenburgh*, amidst all the exorbitant Demands, and the other at the Treaty of *Utrecht*, amidst all their shameful Concessions, took very little Care to provide any commercial Advantages for their Country, \* while the one laboured to protract the War, and the other to precipitate the Peace, solely for the Purposes of Party.

At present it would be indeed lamentable, if merely by mistaking our Interest, when we cannot be misled by Party, we should fall into the same or a greater Error.

It

\* “ *Your Commons naturally inclined to hope, that they should find Care had been taken of securing some particular Advantages to Britain on the Terms of a future Peace, such as might afford a Prospect of making the Nation amends in time for their immense Treasure which hath been expended, and those heavy Debts which have been contracted in the Course of so long and burthensome a War. This reasonable Expectation could no way have been better answered than by some Provision made for the future Security, and the greater Improvement of the Commerce of Great Britain.*” Representation of the Commons, Journals An. 1711, p. 122.

“ *On this Representation they vote the Persons concerned in making the Treaties there referred to, Enemies to their Country.*

“ *That he sacrificed the Commerce of Great Britain to France, and particularly consented to their fishing at Newfoundland.* Art. 13. *Impeachment of Lord Oxford.*” Without entering into the Justice of this Charge, both Parties by their mutual Accusations have sufficiently shewn in what Light they considered this grand Object.



It is an Attempt full of Danger to project a Change in those fundamental Maxims of Policy, by which a Nation has been long sustained, and by which she has grown into Power. It has been remarked, that States have often suffered terrible Falls, or at least a very great and sensible Decline, which might be dated from the Moment of their Arrival at some very considerable Degree of Prosperity. This Fact, which furnishes to Declaimers no more than an Observation of the Fickleness of Fortune, and the Instability of human Affairs, may supply the political Reasoner with Matter of very useful Reflection. It is only in Time of great Prosperity, that States are intirely Masters of their own Conduct, and in a Capacity of executing new Schemes of Policy. An Error in those Schemes becomes at that Time highly dangerous; because they have then Ability to push their Error as far as it will go; and the Mischief they bring upon themselves, is proportionable to the Strength which they abuse. An erroneous Policy always precedes a declining Power. The Moment of Prosperity is therefore critical, and ought to be watched with the utmost Diligence, and used with the greatest Circumspection.

I think this Consideration, which on another Occasion might be too general, is at this Time next to necessary. I have lately observed that, in several political Writings, which did not want Admirers, a System has been laid down, which if no contrary to our national Interest, is  
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at least contrary to all our former Ideas of it ; and what is more material, that System seems to have been admitted as the governing Principle in the late Negotiation. I shall therefore think the Time not lost, which is spent in examining this new Plan with Attention ; and if I should be thought to dwell long upon it, or to grow too minute, the Reader will be pleased to remember, that his Fatigue, whatever it may be, is much less than mine ; and, that we are all deeply concerned in the Event.

In this Enquiry, I shall confine myself to those Matters of which I have been able to furnish myself with exact Details. Without these, all Reasoning concerning commercial Questions, how well soever intended or conducted, will necessarily be lax and inconclusive. Supported by these, it is of very little publick Concern what may be the Character, the Views, or even the Abilities of a political Writer. An intelligent and dispassionate Reader, when he is furnished with the proper Facts, may form a System for himself. By his Temper and his Sagacity, he may counteract the Passions, and supply the Deficiencies of his Author ; and whilst he is enabled to correct his Mistakes, he will sometimes deduce from his Facts a Chain of Consequences, which may possibly have escaped the Writer, who originally furnished him with the Materials of Speculation. It is therefore of no Importance, to enquire what Prejudices may be entertained by the Publick, or by  
any

any private Person, against, or in Favour of, any of the Objects of this Negotiation. The present Enquiry is not concerning Prejudices or Opinions, but concerning Matters of Fact only; and on the Evidence of these, I propose therefore to examine

I. What the System of that Negotiation was with Regard to our Commerce and our Colonies in *America*.

II. To examine into the Strength or Weakness of the Principles upon which that System was founded.

III. To touch upon the Motives which may have induced us at that Time to adopt such Principles.

I chuse to acquaint my Reader with the Method I intend to pursue, because being far from any Intention of the smallest Deceit, or Surprise on his Understanding, this Order will better enable him to watch and to detect me, if I should advance any thing false in Fact or inconclusive in Argument.

The late Negotiation, so far as it regarded our Colonies and Commerce, was on our Side conducted, I apprehend, on one single Idea, *viz.* to secure to ourselves the Possession of all *Canada*. I say, upon this single Idea, because from a careful Examination of the several Plans delivered to the *French* Minister it appears, that even an Attempt was not made, to procure in *America* any other Possession, or any other Advantage whatsoever. Our Interest,  
and



and our Conquests in the *West-Indies*, were very little, if at all, regarded. On the Opening of the Treaty, we agreed to \* negotiate away *Guadaloupe* and *Marigalante*; and in the Turns which that Treaty took, and in all the different Schemes of Commutation, which were from Time to Time proposed, and they were many and various, I do not find that it was for a Moment the Idea to retain that Acquisition we had made in the *West-Indies*, which the very Article that restores it to *France*, denominates a fertile || and wealthy Island; and which the very great Increase of our Trade since its Reduction, demonstrates not to have been at all over-rated in those Epithets, however it might be undervalued in the Exchange by which it was to have been surrendered.

The Reader will not entertain any Doubt that the Treaty was conducted on a Principle wholly averse to *West-Indian* Acquisition, when he recollects this very remarkable Fact.

Early in the Negotiation, and as I may say at the Out-set, we agreed to exchange † *Guadaloupe* for *Minorca*; but during the Progress of that Transaction *Belleisle* fell into our Hands.

\* Hist. Mem. of the Neg. N<sup>o</sup> 21. Art. 8. “ *His Majesty likewise agrees to surrender to the most Christian King the opulent Island of Guadaloupe, with that of Marigalante.*”

|| Hist. Mem. of the Neg. N<sup>o</sup> 27. Art. 6.

† N<sup>o</sup> 17. Art. 3, 4. N<sup>o</sup> 20. Art. 8.

Here was presented a new Subject for Exchange: It was quite natural to barter one *European* Island for another; and it became the more natural, as the one was of no great Advantage to *England*, nor the other to *France*; and both were heavily expensive to their respective Possessors. Accordingly, we find that ‡ Exchange was proposed; but what is very singular, even at the Time of making that Proposal, it does not appear that any Advantage was taken from this Circumstance, to retain the least Particle of our *West-Indian* Conquests. The original Scheme of Compensation was changed; *Belleisle* was offered (so the *French* understood it, and they never were contradicted) for *Minorca*; but *Guadaloupe*, the old Equivalent, was, notwithstanding this new Project, to have been surrendered; though not in Exchange for *Minorca*, nor for any thing else that I can discover; and therefore, without any distinct Compensation at all. Yet here also a Difficulty occurs; for it is not very easy to discover for what Reason *Belleisle* was taken, if it was not to be admitted among the Equivalents. The Expedition for the Reduction of this Island was undertaken after the Commencement of the Negotiation; and the Place could scarcely be desired for any other Purpose, than to give us some Advantage in that Negotiation; and yet a very few Days after we had  
taken

‡ Page 66. Art. 6 and 7. of Hist. Mem. of the Neg.

taken *Belleisle*, its negotiable Value was estimated at nothing; and in all Appearance we suffered it to be added to *Guadaloupe*, in Compensation for an Object which had been before offered us for *Guadaloupe* alone.

To state this Dealing in a few Words; we first offered them *Belleisle*, together with *Guadaloupe*; and at last we gave them *Guadaloupe*, together with *Belleisle*. There was no Variation at all in the Compensations by the Difference, or the Agreement of either of the Parties to the Negotiation, with regard to this Article. This will appear clearly to the Reader, if he compares the early Overtures of the *French* Minister with the subsequent Memorials. For what Reason I cannot judge, we seemed to think these two Objects of equal Value; and in different Ways at different Times we offered each of them *gratis* to the *French*.

Thus we were not satisfied with simply preferring *Minorca* to *Guadaloupe*, but we rejected *Guadaloupe* absolutely, and without any visible Advantage whatever; a Preference and a Rejection, which could by no Possibility have arisen from any other Source than the Maxim which appears to have then governed our Councils; *viz.* that the *West-Indies* were a Part of the World in which we ought to aspire at nothing.

The Stamp of this Maxim is impressed on every Part of the Treaty; without having Recourse to this Principle it is extremely difficult

to account for some Parts of our Conduct, which must otherwise appear altogether irregular and unsystematical.

The Fate of *Senegal* and *Goree* became a principal Matter of Dispute in this Negotiation. With Regard to these, we were to the last Degree tenacious of our Acquisition. The *French* would have been content with one of these Objects; they agreed to cede the Isle of *Goree*, without which *Senegal* would always have been at our Mercy \*. At length however they agreed to give up both *Senegal* and *Goree*; but in order to render this Cession which we had so much at Heart palatable to *France*, we consented to give them in return some *Douceurs* in the Slave Trade. It does not appear very clearly from the Memorial what they were; *Acra* and *Anamabo* were mentioned by the *French*; and they were not in Appearance refused on the Part of *England*. Whatever was the real Equivalent, this, however, is plain, that we thought *Senegal* and *Goree* very worthy of some Concessions, and of a great deal of Negotiation.

Now without recurring to the Maxim I have just mentioned, what colourable Reason can possibly be assigned for our Conduct? We were not so fond of *Senegal* and *Goree* because they were a Security to our Colonies in *North America*. We did not seek them, to give us

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\* Hist. Mem. of the Neg. 15 July. Nov. 17. Art. 7.

a Superiority in the *Mediterranean*. It must be merely as commercial Objects that we valued them. We could possibly have no other Motive. But were they, in a commercial View, Objects as considerable as *Guadaloupe*? No one ever imagined it. I shall shew presently that the Trade of *Guadaloupe* is above seventeen times more considerable. What then could have been put into the Scale of *Senegal* to turn the Ballance in its Favour against this immense Disproportion : except the Resolution, however it came to prevail, that we ought not to extend our Trade, or our Empire in the *West-Indies*?

It is necessary the Reader should be warned, that the Question then was not, nor now is, which should have the Preference in our Estimation, *Guadaloupe* or *Canada*, the *West-Indian*, or the *North American* Commerce; that Question was practically decided by the voluntary unsolicited Cession of the whole Country of *Canada*, \* by *France* herself.

Had it indeed been necessary, by the Surrender of the fertile Island of *Guadaloupe*, to purchase the vast but unprofitable Forests of *Canada*, the Passion at least of boundless Empire would have been flattered. There had perhaps

\* Page 32 of Hist. Mem. of the Neg. “ Before a Memorial of Propositions was sent in Form to the Court of London, his Majesty’s Minister entrusted to confer with Mr. Stanley, authorised him to write word, that France would guaranty the Possession of *Canada* to England.”



perhaps been something magnificent in such a Delusion. But from the Beginning there was no mention of an Exchange of that Nature. The first Overtures to the Treaty declare, that, not *Guadaloupe*, but the Privilege of the Fishery at *Newfoundland*, was the Compensation for *Canada*; and through the whole Negotiation, no particular Consideration is specified as the Compensation of *Guadaloupe* on our Side, but singly the Restitution of *Minorca* on theirs †.

When we had satisfied our Views in *North America*, our whole Business in *America* seemed to be considered as over. We hurried to *Europe*, and to *Africa*; our Thoughts being wholly alienated from the *West-Indian Commerce*.

It will perhaps be objected against the Universality of the Assertion, that by Article the § 5th of the *French Memorial* of the 15th of *July* 1761; as also in ours of || 29th of the same Month, a Division of the four Islands called Neutral, was provided; and therefore we did not so intirely reject all Ideas of Acquisition in the *West-Indies*. The Fact I readily admit; but

† Page 27 of the Fr. Hist. Mem. “*The Liberty of fishing, and the Shelter without Fortifications, was the Compensation for the Cession of all Canada.*” The “*Restitution of the Island of Minorca, was certainly equivalent to the Cession of Guadaloupe and Marigalante.*”

§ Vide Page 29. of the Hist. Mem. of the Neg.

|| N<sup>o</sup> 21. Art. 5. Hist. Mem. of the Neg.

but I am very far from admitting also the Inference; for I apprehend, the Discussion of this Fact will add new Strength to my Assertion, instead of being in any Degree derogatory to the Point which I intend to establish.

For I affirm, in this Partition of the neutral Islands, supposing the intended Partition to have been fair and equal in Point of Value (which I shall hereafter prove was by no Means the Case) instead of acquiring any thing by our Superiority in the War, instead of increasing our Claims in Consequence of our Victories, we actually receded from those Claims, on which we had always insisted, previous to those Conquests, and previous even to the War itself. In all our Memorials \* on this Subject, we contended for the absolute exclusive Right to the neutral Islands, and in Consequence of this Right, so early I think as 1722, we attempted a Settlement in the only one which is valuable amongst them, *St. Lucie*; and though we tamely suffered this Settlement to be destroyed, we still kept our Pretensions alive with all the Vigour of which Negotiation is capable. And what is very remarkable, our Right is no where more clearly asserted than in that very Article, in which we agreed to give away these Islands. †

But

\* Vid. Memorials of the *English* and *French* Commissioners concerning *St. Lucie*. London, 1755. Quarto.

† Vid. Hist. Mem. of the Neg. p. 37, 38. Art. 5. of the Answer of the *British* Court to the Memorial of *French* Propositions.

But allowing the Pretensions of *England* and *France* to those Islands had been equal in the Ballance, yet the Division even then, and allowing it to have been an equal Division, has given us just nothing. The Equality of the Right has produced an equal Partition of the contested Object; and each of the Litigants has taken a Part, in Compensation of his Pretensions to the Whole: On this footing we have only ended a Dispute, we cannot pretend to say we have made an Acquisition.

But if, as we have always understood, and uniformly asserted, our exclusive Right to those Islands was clear, and indisputable; then we are not only no Gainers, but we are even considerable Losers by the Stipulation contained in this Article; and our immense Expences, and brilliant Advantages in the *West-Indies*, have only afforded us an Opportunity of giving up our new Acquisitions; and along with them a considerable Part of our old patrimonial Rights. Either it was unjust to have laid claim to the neutral Islands, if that Claim was not well founded; or, if we had the Right we pretended to the Whole, it did not appear quite reasonable, after a victorious War, to accept of a Part only.

In *North America* we aimed to acquire a great deal more than we originally pretended to. In the *West-Indies* we gave up a considerable Part even of our oldest and most valid Claims.



Claims. It is therefore evident, that our Conduct with regard to the neutral Islands, instead of being an Objection to my Observations on this Treaty, furnishes a new and irrefragable Proof in support of them ; and indeed demonstrates, that instead of aiming to extend, we thought it rather our Interest to contract our Dominions in the *West-Indies* ; and this naturally conducts us to the second Point which I propose to examine :

Whether the general System, which I have shewn to have prevailed in that Negotiation, was founded on Reason, and the real reciprocal Interest of *Great Britain* and her Colonies ; and whether the particular Objects we were to have received in Compensation, were equivalent to the Cessions by which they were to have been purchased.

I will even push this Enquiry further, and endeavour to find out from an Investigation of decisive Facts, whether the whole Aggregate of all the Advantages of every sort which we were to have obtained by every other Article of the Treaty, were not infinitely counterballanced by what we lost in that single Article, by which we were to have surrendered *Guadaloupe*. These are, I am sure, very interesting Disquisitions, and very worthy the most serious Attention.

And first, with regard to the general Maxim of rejecting or greatly undervaluing a *West-Indian* Acquisition, I hope I shall make it appear to the Satisfaction of every unprejudiced

Reader, that it was grounded on a Want of due Attention to the Importance of the *West-Indian* Colonies, in our System of Commerce; and that it could never have prevailed, if we had made the least Enquiry into the Advantages which the *West-Indian* Trade possesses, either solely, or in a Degree very superior to any other. To say the Truth, I cannot help feeling some Surprize, that such Ignorance, with such Means of Information, could possibly become at all common in a commercial Nation; or that we should ourselves mistake, or suffer others to mislead us so excessively with regard to the relative Value of our *North American* and *West-Indian* Possessions.

The fundamental Principle on which all Ideas of *West-Indian* Acquisition have been rejected, is a Maxim, laid down by the Writer of the Letter to two great Men; *That we had already Sugar Land enough*. There is no Word whatsoever of greater Latitude in the Construction, when it is referred to private Concerns, than this Word *enough*. With regard to the Publick, it is often contracted within very reasonable Limits. Does it here mean that we have Sugar Land sufficient to supply the Home Consumption? It is not strictly true, that we have enough for the Consumption of all the *British* Dominions. We know that in *Ireland* they use some, and in *North America* a very great Quantity of foreign Sugars, and Syrups; and we have Reason to believe that  
some

some find their Way even into *England*. If he means that we have enough for foreign Consumption, surely he is by this Time at least informed, that before the War we had in a Manner wholly lost the foreign Market for this Commodity. And unless he, or somebody for him, will be pleased to prove that the Sugar Commerce is detrimental, or not very advantageous to us, I conceive this Assertion will be altogether equivalent to a general Declaration, that we have foreign Trade enough. A Declaration, which however repugnant to Fact, and to the national Interest, is altogether consistent with the System laid down in that Letter.

A further necessary Consequence of this Maxim, of our having Sugar Land enough, is, that *France* has not too much of it. Indeed, if the *West-Indian* is a losing Trade, it is very agreeable to that Writer's Patriot Spirit, to wish the *French* as much of it as possible. However, though from very different Motives, he agrees perfectly with *France* herself in this Particular, She enjoys a considerable Territory in, and a most extensive Trade with the *West-Indies*, of which she is far from wishing any even the least Diminution. A little before the breaking out of this War, from the single Port of *Bordeaux* she exported within thirty-two Months in *West-Indian* Commodities

to the Amount of 2.768,628*l*. \* I am not fond of advancing any thing, without the Support of authenticated Vouchers ; but I am certain, I risque very little in saying, that the Export from *Bourdeaux*, immense as it is, does not amount to more than one Half of the whole Export of *France* in *West-Indian* Commodities ; those who are acquainted with the Trade of *Marseilles*, *Nantes*, and the other principal Ports, will know that I speak very moderately. The *West-Indies* furnished to *France* therefore in the said thirty-two Months an exported Produce worth 5.537,256*l*. or 2.076,471*l*. a Year, all which was purchased by her Manufactures ; all which going to her Credit in the Account of her general Trade, was in some Respects equal to, and in others, superior in Value to so much Treasure.

By what Lights the Writer, whose dogmatic Assertion I am here considering, is directed in his Opinion concerning Commerce, I confess I know not ; but for my Part, I have not even a Conception of any one Article of Trade more considerable in its Extent, nor more valuable  
in

\* Account of *West-Indian* Produce, exported from *Bourdeaux*, from *January* 1750, to *August* 1752.

Hhds of Brown Sugar.	White Ditto.	Indigo. lb.	
35,219.	65,215.	1,624,208.	
Coffee. lb.	Cacoo. lb.	Annatto.	Hides.
11.824,454.	224,405.	251,598.	7,169.

The original Vouchers from the Custom-house of *Bourdeaux*, which authenticate the above Export, may be seen at Mr. *Doddsley's*.

in its Nature, than this of *France* with her *West-Indian* Colonies; nor any Object more fit to rouse our Jealousy, and (where the Acquisition can be rendered lawful) more proper to excite our Desires. *France* is indeed so truly sensible of its Value, and is so far from thinking she enjoys too much of this Trade, that she would sooner yield a thousand Miles in *North America*, than one hundred Acres in the *West-Indies*. We must not suppose the *French* are as intirely ignorant of their commercial Interest, as we seem at present elevated above the Consideration of ours.

Whatever this Writer may imagine of our Sufficiency in our Sugar Land, the ingenious Advocate of his System (the Author of the *Interest of the Colonies*) thinks otherwise, and formally gives up this fundamental Principle of the Scheme he defends. He declares that he is \* far from thinking we have Sugar Land enough, and for this he assigns very solid † Reasons. He admits the *West-Indies* to be extremely valuable, not only in our direct Trade, but also to that of *North America*. He states  
the

\* Vid. Int. of Col. p. 46. " I am far from thinking we have Sugar Land enough."

† Vid. Int. of Col. p. 46. " It is often said we have Plenty of Sugar Land still unemployed in Jamaica: but those who are well acquainted with that Island, know, that the remaining vacant Land in it is generally situated among Mountains, Rocks and Gullies, that make Carriage impracticable, so that no profitable Use can be made of it, unless the Price of Sugars should so greatly increase as to enable the Planters to make very expensive Roads, by blowing up Rocks, erecting Bridges, &c. every 2 or 300 Yards."



the *West-Indian* Trade to be at a Stand \*; and that the Scantiness of our Sugar Plantations will not suffer it to extend †. These Admissions appear extraordinary in a Piece written with a View to divert us from *West-Indian* Acquisition, and particularly to depreciate the Value of *Guadaloupe*.

In what Manner he attempts to explain this commercial Paradox, and to reconcile this apparent Contradiction, we shall see in its Place, and, I believe, not without some Astonishment.

I have here only to observe, that in what I shall have occasion to remark upon this new System, I shall all along attend to the Writer last mentioned; because of all those who have written with a View to reverse our Notions of the *American* Commerce, he is clearly the ablest, the most ingenious, the most dexterous, and the most perfectly acquainted with the Force and Foible of the Argument; and we may therefore conclude, that he has said every thing, and every thing in the best Manner, that the Cause could bear.

But before I proceed to lay before the Reader those Considerations, which seem to me most efficacious towards bringing us back to our original, and, I imagine, just Notions on this Subject,

I

\* Vid. Inst. of Col. p. 35. “ *Our Trade to the West-Indian Islands is undoubtedly a valuable one; but whatever is the Amount of it, it has long been at a Stand.*”

† “ *Limited, as our Sugar Planters are by the Scantiness of Territories, they cannot increase much beyond their present Number.*”

I think it not amiss to state more particularly what these Notions were. By this stating we shall be enabled to discern how very far some of our modern Politicians have deviated from the Ideas of our Ancestors, whose wise Regulations and provident Policy have transmitted to us so extensive a Trade, and, on the Basis of that Trade, so substantial a Power.

The Scheme of Policy pursued by our Ancestors with regard to our Commerce and Colonies is all comprehended and centered in the *Act of Navigation*. This Law, which has been justly considered as the *Magna Charta* of our Trade, carefully provides that every Article of the then Produce of the *West-Indies*, and of the Southern Provinces of *North America*, should be exported to \* *England* only. With regard to the Northern Provinces of that same Continent, the Act has appropriated to *England*  
no

\* The Commodities appropriated to the Mother Country by the 12 Car. II. commonly called enumerated Commodities, are, Sugar, Tobacco, Cotton, Indigo, the dying Woods, and Ginger; Rice and Molasses were added in the Reign of Queen *Anne*; and the Legislator afterwards entertaining Hopes, that the Continent of *North America* might be rendered useful, by the Trade of Naval Stores, appropriated to the Mother Country, all the Kinds of those Stores, by specifying them, together with Iron, Copper Ore, and Furs, among the enumerated Commodities; the Southern Provinces of this Continent only, have answered this Expectation, in any tolerable Degree; *Carolina* has produced some, but not the best, Pitch, Tar, and Turpentine; the other Kinds of Naval Stores sent hither from *America*, are scarce worth mentioning. The great Trade of the Northern Parts is still in Commodities, not enumerated, and there is great Reason to fear it will always continue so.

no Part of their then Produce but Furs. Under the Direction of the Legislator's Jealousy we may form a Judgment of the Tendency and Strength of his Affections. He found in the Products of the *West-Indies*, and of the Southern continental Provinces, all the Conditions of a perfect *Colony Trade*. 1st. The Products were valuable, as well at the home as at the foreign Market. 2dly. By a Possibility of effecting a total Obstruction of their Communication with Foreigners, every Part of the Benefit of the Plantation Produce and Trade was secured to the Mother Nation. 3dly. The constitutional Dependence was unshakeably established by this necessary and only Intercourse with *Great Britain*. And lastly, which was the leading Object of the Act in all its Regulations, the Seamen employed in this Trade, being, previous to every out, and subsequent to every home, Voyage, necessarily found in *England*, the Resources sought for our naval Power, were at Home and in our own Power. Of this Trade the Legislator was therefore not only careful but jealous. As to the Northern Provinces, it was visible to him, that they could never come directly, nor without many Limitations, under the *commercial Ideas of Colonies*. They could not, except in a few Articles, trade with *England* directly, and therefore must often trade with Foreigners. By this original and irremediable Fault in the Nature of their Produce, neither the trading nor the constitutionable

Dependence



Dependence of those Provinces could be so solidly and so entirely secured. Their Shipping and Seamen might grow numerous, and yet add little to the Resources of the *English* Navy. They could at best in a *trading Light* be considered only as *half Colonies*; since it was impossible to subject them to those Regulations, to which the Colonies of every *European* Power are obliged to submit, in order effectually to answer the Purposes for which Plantations are established; the true Plantation Trade forming the most valuable Object of Commerce to every Country which possesses it. The Act therefore enterprised but little for the Regulation of their Trade: it was not encouraged, because it interfered with our home Trade: and it was not checked, because that Check would have been prejudicial to an innocent People, and because we derived some collateral Advantages from it.

The Spirit, therefore, of the Act of Navigation was directly the reverse of that, which has influenced some of our modern Politicians, who have considered the northern Provinces on the Continent of *America* as the only Objects deserving Attention; and have treated with Neglect, and even Contempt, those Objects, which our Ancestors have taken such great, and almost exclusive Care, to provide for, in the most leading and important of all their commercial Laws.

I shall now proceed to lay before the Reader such Considerations, as must tend to bring us  
E
back

back to our original, and, I imagine, true Notions on this Subject.

Having thus shewn the Maxims, on which we formerly conducted ourselves in our commercial Policy, I shall now lay before the Reader some Considerations tending to prove, that, with regard to the *West-Indian* Trade, there is no reason at present to alter our System.

The first Consideration which I propose on our *West-Indian* Commerce, is its Quantity and Value, even in its bounded State before the War.

The direct Import of *Great Britain* alone from the *West-Indies*, in the Year 1759, a Year subject to the Losses and Casualties of War, and exclusive of *Guadaloupe*, which was then but just conquered, amounted to no less than 1.833,648 l. 16s. 8d. whereas the Import from the great and populous northern Colonies of *New England*, *New York*, and *Pennsylvania*, all taken together, amounted but to 70,074 l. 12s. 3d. and the whole *North American* Import together amounted to little more than a Third of the *West-Indian*.

The second Consideration relating to the *West-Indian* Commerce, is its comprehensive and connective Nature : from the many Branches of our Trade that depend upon, and center in it.

With regard to our Dominions in *Europe*, there is scarce an Article of *British* Produce which is not largely consumed in the *West-Indies* ; and there is not in the *West-Indies* any other Source of internal or external Supply,  
than

than from *Great Britain* and her Colonies. Other Nations, nay, our other Colonies trade with us, and with one another for Convenience at best; the Trade of the *West-Indies* with *Great Britain* is necessary to them, necessary as their Existence: and they neither have, nor possibly can have an Interest either in the least distinct from, or in the least interfering with ours.

The Benefit of the *West-India* Trade to our *European* Dominions is not confined to *Great Britain*. Our Island Colonies, and they alone, take off a large Quantity of Provisions from *Ireland*; a Consideration of no trivial Consequence, not only from the Connection of Interest by which that Trade binds together the several Parts of our Empire, but also because, whatever Provisions go to our own Colonies are so much taken from the Markets of our most dangerous Rivals, and most determined Enemies.

A third Consideration, and a very weighty one, is, that almost the whole of that extensive and lucrative Trade, which we carry on with the Coast of *Africa*, is maintained by, and must be put to the Account of the *West-Indies*, because the *West-India* Islands form the great Markets for Negroe Slaves.

The Trade to *Africa* is of the very best Kind. It is for the greatest Part fed with our own Manufactures; our Fire Arms, our Ammunition, our Utensils, our Stuffs, and our Spirits, of all which we exported in the Year 1761 to the Value of 254,381 l. 11s. 5d. What

remains of the Assortment for that Market is composed entirely of *East-Indian* Goods, of which in the same Year it took off 78,576l. 18s. 6d.

Thus the *West-Indies* sustain, not only a large Share of the direct *English* Trade, but also contribute very considerably to the Support of that mighty Pillar of our national Commerce and Credit, the *East-India* Company. I must beg leave to repeat it, and to fix it in the Reader's Memory, that the *African* Trade centers in, and is supported by the *West-Indies*; and that this Trade, with its consequential Advantages, is the principal Dependence of the two after *London*, the greatest and most flourishing trading Cities in *Great Britain*, *Bristol* and *Liverpool*.

There is another Consideration relative to this Trade, still more important in itself, and more essential in the present Examination, because it will point out to us how ill we consult the Interest of *North America* herself, either relatively to her own particular Prosperity, or to her Intercourse with us, when we happen, as I conceive we have in this Treaty, to neglect the *West-Indian* Commerce.

For several of the most considerable Commodities of *North America*, particularly of the most northern Parts, their Plank, their Lumber, their Staves, their Provision, there exists no other Market whatever, than the *West-Indian* Islands; for their Corn and their Fish, it is the nearest and best they can find. It will be necessary further to observe, that these  
Commodities,

Commodities, being gross and bulky, employ a very great Number of Vessels; and these Vessels again are not only the Carriers of their Commodities, but are also themselves a Commodity of great Consideration, and form one of the most lucrative Branches of the *North American Trade*. In a Word, it is by Means of the *West-Indian Trade* that a great Part of *North America* is at all enabled to trade with us, for they principally pay the Ballance due to *Great Britain*, which otherwise they could never pay, out of this Fund; either in Cash, or in Bills drawn by the *West-Indian Merchant* on *London*, or in the Return of *West-Indian Produce* on their own Account; for the Ballance in this Trade is always considerably in their Favour.

That this Consideration, and the Inference drawn from it, is not pushed too far to serve a present Purpose in Argument, I shall evince, by shewing that the same Consideration was made, and the same Consequence inferred, many Years since, by a very able Writer on Trade, and long before this Controversy existed. “ As  
 “ our northern Colonies, says this judicious  
 “ Writer, answer their Returns to *Great*  
 “ *Britain*, by Means chiefly of our Sugar  
 “ Islands, it shews plainly how much it be-  
 “ hoves us to secure and preserve, *increase* and  
 “ encourage, the Sugar Islands; for without  
 “ our southern Plantations, our northern Co-  
 “ lonies can be of no real Advantage to us,  
 “ since what they at present are must cease  
 “ on



“ on the Decay, or Loss of the Sugar Islands,  
 “ from whence *their Value* to Great Britain  
 “ chiefly arises, and for Want of which they  
 “ would be otherwise *prejudicial Colonies* to  
 “ *their Mother-country* \*.”

So that in Reality the Trade of these *North American* Provinces, when stated in its true Light, is, as well as that of *Africa*, to be regarded but as a dependent Member, and subordinate Department of the *West-Indian* Trade; it must rise and fall exactly as the *West-Indies* flourish or decay.

I hope I cannot be so far misunderstood, as if I meant to deny the Importance of our continental Colonies; I am, on the contrary, extremely sensible of their Value, and affected with an unfeigned Zeal for their Prosperity; but I should be sorry it were found to be a Zeal without Knowledge. I know that the Insular and Continental Colonies of *America*, are reciprocally beneficial to each other; but the Benefit, though reciprocal, is not equal. The *West-Indies* might be supplied directly from *England*, with most of the Articles which come from our northern Plantations, though, I admit, neither quite so cheap, nor with so much Convenience. I might add, that from the very improved State of Agriculture and Pasturage in our *European* Dominions, our Sugar Colonies would suffer much less from a Deficiency in *North America*, than those of *France*, to whose Prosperity the Trade with the *English* northern

\* *Vide* Survey of Trade, published in 1718, Page 149.

northern Colonies is more necessary by far than it is to the *English West-Indies*; which might flourish, though the northern Establishments did not exist. On the other hand it is certain, if the *West - India* Market was taken away, these northern Colonies must of Necessity lose more than Three-fourths of their whole Trade; and a Trade of the more Importance to them, and to the Welfare of the Mother-country; the Ballance being, as I think I have before observed, very greatly, and very uniformly, in their Favour. It is not to depreciate the *North American* Trade, that I have made these Observations, but merely to set it in its proper Place in our commercial System; for a Consideration of Things out of their due Order, is often worse than no Consideration of them at all.

The *West - India* being the great direct Trade, and that, through which the Balance of all is paid to *England*; that Trade, of which our Ancestors in the Act of Navigation, the Parent of all our Trade, shewed such extreme Jealousy, and of which alone they shewed any Jealousy, must in Reason be considered as the primary Object in the System of our Colonies. Those subordinate Systems of Commerce, which exist by administering to the Support of that primary Trade, as those of *Africa* and *North America*, must always be considered in a secondary Light, and as they are connected to that of the *West-Indies*, in whose Orbit they must move: and nothing can be so capially and preposterously absurd,

as to form Schemes for the Extension of our Dominions in *North America* and *Africa*, on a Plan exclusive of the *West-Indies*. It would be almost as rational to think of fattening a Beast, after you had sewed up his Mouth.

I must further observe on the relative Value, to *Great Britain*, of our *West-Indian* and northern Colonies, that the Duties imposed on Sugar form no contemptible Object in our Revenue. No one Commodity of *North America*, except Tobacco (and that is the Growth of only *Virginia* and *Maryland*) is in the least subservient, either there or here, to our Expences, and to the Support of the general Interest.

But besides the Duties which the *West-Indian* Produce pays in *Great Britain*, there is also a *British* Duty paid in the *West-Indies*. I speak here of the Four and a Half *per Cent.* Duty, paid on the Spot by all Commodities of the Growth of the *Lesser Antilles*. From this Duty near forty thousand Pounds a Year comes into the Treasury. This is a direct Tribute which the *West-Indies* pay to us for our Protection. None of our northern continental Colonies pay any thing of this Sort; and some of them, after immense and almost incredible Sums expended on them, are still burthensome.

Before I close this Article, I think it not amiss to remark upon an Extract from the *Custom-house* Entries, cited in the Postscript to the Pamphlet I have already so often mentioned, which was wrote purely with a View to depreciate our *West-Indian* Islands, and to



exaggerate the Importance of *North America*, in a Light independent of the *West-Indies*.

We there find \* the Export to the *West-Indies* in the Year 1758, to have been but 877,571 l. 19 s. 11 d. whereas that, to *North America*, amounted to 1.832,948 l. 13 s. 10 d.

In order to discover the extreme Fallacy of this Proceeding, you must observe that, while he displays the *British* Export to *North America*, and to the *West-Indies*, he takes due Care intirely to sink the Import, that is to say, the Returns to *Great Britain* from both. He shews you indeed where the *British* Goods go; but he neither shews you from whence, nor by what Means, they are paid for. The Author is, to do him justice, too knowing in his Subject to have made this Omission through Inadvertency. It is easily accounted for.

If he had given a fair State of our Exports to, and Imports from *North America* and the *West-Indies* respectively, the Account would have stood thus:

	l.	s.	d.		l.	s.	d.
Exports to <i>North America</i> ,	1.832,948	13	10	Imports from the <i>West-Indies</i> ,	1.834,036	2	2
Imports from <i>North America</i> ,				Exports to the <i>West- Indies</i> ,			
	648,683	0	4		877,571	19	11
<hr/>				<hr/>			
Deficiency of Imports, being a Bal- lance due to <i>Great Bri- tain</i> from <i>N. America</i> ,	1.184,265	13	6	Excessof Im- ports, being a Ballance due from <i>Great Britain</i> to the <i>West Indies</i> .	956,464	2	3

\* Vide Int. of Col. Page 57.

And from such a fair State of those Trades two Things must have appeared ; first, that the Returns made by *North America* to *Great Britain* are excessively inferior to what *North America* receives from hence, whereby a *Ballance stands against North America* of no less than 1.184,265*l.* 13*s.* 6*d.* And as we know that *North America* contains no Mines of Gold or Silver, the Reader must naturally have inquired by what Means this Ballance was made up to *Great Britain* ; and this Enquiry would have led his Attention to the *West-Indian Trade*; the fair State of which would have discovered the second Thing, *viz.* that contrary to the Case of *North America*, the Returns made by the *West-Indies* to *Great Britain* are excessively superior to what the *West-Indies* receive from hence, whereby a *Ballance stands for the West Indies*, of no less than 956,464 *l.* 2*s.* 3*d.* Now as it is well known that we never send Treasure to the *West-Indies* to make up this Ballance (on the contrary we receive a great deal from thence) it would as naturally be asked how this Overplus on the Side of the *West-Indies* was answered and ballanced on the Side of *Great Britain*; and this, upon Examination, would appear to have been done by three Ways.

*First*, By our *West-Indies* taking upon themselves the Payment of a very large Part of that excessive *North American* Deficiency, a Fact that would clearly have shewn the Dependence of *North America* on that Trade, without which our *North American* Colonies could never pay  
 3 for,

for, nor consequently take off, our Manufactures.

*Secondly*, In paying for almost the whole *African* Trade, by which their Importance in another Light would have become evident. And,

*Thirdly*, In the very great Sums spent by the *West - Indian* Planters resident in *England*; whereas we derive scarce any Advantage of that Kind, none I am sure that is worth mentioning, from any of the continental Plantations to the Northward.

All this, I say, would have appeared from a fair and ballanced State of the Exports to, and Imports from, *North America* and the *West-Indies*; and this, instead of lowering, would have raised the vast Importance of the *West-India* Plantations. Whereas, from the imperfect, and therefore fallacious State of it, given by that Writer, an inattentive, uninformed Reader might be apt to imagine, that *Great Britain* had no other Advantage from the *West-Indies*, than simply what arose from her Exports thither; than which Supposition nothing can be more groundless.

This Writer goes still further; and, as it were in Triumph, proceeds to shew how small the proportional Increase of the *West-India* Trade has been to that of *North America*. This is, I believe, very lamentably true; but after what has been said, the Reader, I imagine, will of himself draw a Conclusion from it diametrically opposite to that Gentleman's Wishes\*. He will see (for even that Gentleman

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will

\* Vid. Int. of Col. p. 35.

will inform him) that our *West-India* Trade has been cramped *merely for Want of Land*, and not for Want of Market. Whereas the *North American* Trade has extended, because it had Land sufficient to bear such an Extent for Ages to come, and because it found a Market, not indeed in the *English*, but in the *French Sugar Colonies*, which had also increased abundantly, because they (the *French*) had Land in Abundance, in the *West-Indies*. Common Sense would dictate to us the Scheme of Acquisition where we wanted, not where we did not want; and the same plain Guide would direct us to prefer that Plan, which, by the Operation of one single Principle; must extend our Trade where it was limited, and rectify it, where it was wrong directed. Acquisition in the *West-Indies* must increase our limited and decaying Sugar Trade, and at the same time recall our, extensive indeed, but erring Trade of *North America*, from *French* to *English* Markets.

This single Consideration might seem sufficient to enforce the Propriety, I had almost said Necessity, of making Acquisitions in the *West-Indies* even in Preference, had that been the Dispute, as it was not, to continental Acquisitions; but there is another Consideration resulting from the same Fact, which in my Opinion is still more cogent.

This Author has shewn, that our Export to the *West-Indies*, is greatly inferior to our Export to the northern Colonies. But he has, perhaps,

perhaps, more artfully, than ingenuously, omitted the Proportion of the Inhabitants, who call for these Exports. In all the *British* Islands it will be difficult to raise the Whites to 90,000; Now if in the Year 1758, these 90,000 consumed 877,571l. 19s. 11d. and the Inhabitants of *North America*, who exceed a Million and an half, took off, according to his own stating of the Question, but 1.832,948l. 13s. 10d. it appears at a Glance that one Man in the *West-Indies* is worth to the Trade of the Mother Country as much as eight are worth in *North America*, which shews how much more valuable the Trade of the *West-Indies* is, than the Trade of *North America*, in Proportion to the Number of Inhabitants; and if we were to take in the Extent of Territory, we should be lost in the Disproportion. From these Facts, furnished by that Author for a direct contrary Purpose, we must necessarily infer it to be our Interest, not indeed to contract, or in any-wise neglect our continental Possessions, but to attend to the Increase of those between the Tropicks, as the primary and leading Object of our Policy.

To return, I have shewn that the *West-Indian* Trade is almost the sole Support of the *African*; the principal Support of the *North American*; a most beneficial Market for the *East-Indian*; and a very great Consumer of our Home Commodities. Can any thing more irresistibly direct us where we are bound, if  
our



our national Interest constitutes our political Obligations, to acquire and to keep? especially when we take into our Consideration a Matter, in my Opinion, absolutely decisive in this Controversy, that, in *North America*, we had Land without Bounds, and a very contracted Market, and that, with Regard to the *West-Indies*, we had a Market without Limits, and Means of supplying it altogether disproportioned.

The Reader will not forget that the Foundation of the Treaty was an *uti possidetis*. The *French* admitted our Possession for a Right, they did not even desire any Restitution for which they did not profess to pay a full and just Equivalent; *France* left the Valuation of the Equivalent to ourselves. If any Offer of theirs appeared unequal to what they asked in Return, we were left at Liberty to retain our Possession, for the Barter was only to take place on a Supposition of mutual Conveniency. This was admitted to be the governing Principle of all the Exchanges and Equivalents proposed in that Treaty.

Now, whether *Minorca* can be considered as a full and just Equivalent for *Guadaloupe*, which was to have been ceded in Exchange for it by that Treaty, is what I propose to examine; and this I shall do by stating, to the utmost of my Knowledge, and the best of my Judgment, the Advantages of both.

The Advantages of *Minorca* were either political or commercial. The political Advantages, which we were said to derive from that Island,

Island, were, that by the Possession of the fortified Harbour of *Mahon*, we awed the pyratrical States of *Barbary*; that we made ourselves respectable to the *Italian* Powers; and that we were better able in Times of War to support the Operations of our Allies, and distress the *Mediterranean* Trade of the Enemy.

These Advantages were undoubtedly in some Degree real, and in some Degree important. Let them stand at their full Value; but at the same Time let it be remembered, that at the very Beginning of this War, we lost *Minorca*; and that by this Loss, from that Time to this Moment, now near six Years, we have scarce felt the least Prejudice in any of the above-mentioned Instances. We still awed the *African* States, we still preserved the Respect of the *Italian* Powers, and we abundantly damaged the Enemy's Trade; the Possession of *Gibraltar* proved fully sufficient for all these Purposes.

The commercial Advantages of *Minorca* are very easily enumerated; they consisted in one single, and that no very considerable, Article. The *Minorquins* sent hither the Value of about 500*l.* annually of an ordinary and little esteemed Wine. This was the whole of the Commerce they carried on with *Great Britain*, except that in return they took some few of our Manufactures, but not to half the Value of the Money which we ourselves had before sent thither, to pay our Garrison.

Against

Against this respectable Return, it will be necessary to ballance the Expence of keeping the Object of so desirable a Commerce. In the Year 1753, a Time of profound Peace, it appears by the publick Accounts, that the military Establishment of this Island cost the Nation 74,293 l. The civil Government had wholly swallowed up its own little Revenue. In the Year 1742, a Year of War, the Expence arose to 84,231 l. I only state the current Expence; the immense Sums from Time to Time expended on the Fortifications are totally omitted. From this Idea of the Value of *Minorca*, we may in Part estimate the Damage we sustained by the Loss, and the Solicitude we ought to shew for the Recovery, of this Possession. By losing *Minorca*, we lost 500 l. *per Annum* in our gross Trade, and we acquired to the Revenue at the lowest Rate 74,293 l. The political Advantages of *Minorca* are in a great measure, if not entirely, supplied by *Gibraltar*; and in the commercial Light, the Loss of that Island has been an annual Saving to the Nation of the Interest of above two Millions of our national Debt.

Let us suppose, that by this Treaty we were to have made no Sacrifices at all, in Return for this Island; but that the *French* had freely agreed to surrender *Minorca* without any Compensation; may it not be Matter of some Doubt, whether, even in that Case, it would have been very clearly, or at least very materially, our Interest to accept their Offer. In whatsoever Manner this Doubt may be resolved, I am confident  
it

it would be the Interest of *France*, rather to give it up for nothing, than to continue at the Expence of an Incumbrance, without Dignity or Profit, and which can add nothing whatsoever to their Commerce, their Strength, or their Reputation.

But they were sensible of our Foible, they were not so disinterested as to part even with an Incumbrance, without obliging us to pay an high Price for it; but they took care, however, not to imitate our Conduct, when an Object of the like Kind came to be offered on our Side, and to be valued by them. Though we had the Generosity to purchase an Incumbrance from them, they refused in their Turn to disburthen us at their own Charge, and they declared that they knew *Belleisle* could be of no Use\* to us, and they dealt accordingly; they left us *Belleisle*, they would bid nothing for it, and having ‡ refused to set any Value upon it, they compelled us to admit the Insignificance of that Possession, by our yielding it without any Compensation whatsoever.

They were, on the other Side, too wise not to make an Advantage of our Predilection. They affected to raise *Minorca* to Consideration,

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\* Vid. Hist. Mem. of the Neg. P. 27. “ *France thought the keeping of Belleisle would be more expensive than profitable to England.*”

‡ Vid. Hist. Mem. of the Neg. No 22. Art. 6. “ *It seems as if England offered Belleisle for Minorca, as France does not allow the Importance of Belleisle, the two Courts will retain their several Opinions, England shall maintain her Conquest, and France shall lose Minorca.*”

by the Price they demanded for it, and required for one of the worst Islands in *Europe*, two as well circumstanced for Trade, as any in the *West-Indies*.

To set the Propriety of this Exchange in its full Light, I shall take a very short, but I hope, a very satisfactory Method. I shall begin with laying before the Reader a naked Fact, a Table of the Value of the Commodities imported in one Year from *Guadaloupe* into *England*. On this I shall afterwards make a few explanatory Remarks.

*Produce of Guadaloupe at the English Market, from Christmas 1760, to Christmas 1761, at the prime Cost.*

Commodities	Value.		
	<i>l.</i>	<i>s.</i>	<i>d.</i>
Cocoa Nuts	11,497	0	0
Coffee	66,261	16	3
Cassia Fistula	3,100	8	0
Tamarinds	17	5	0
Dry Ginger	2,713	19	0
Sugar	405,022	4	0
Cow Hides	508	4	0
Indigo	462	18	0
Cordial Waters	27	0	0
Rum	775	0	0
Succades	90	19	6
Cotton	112,792	10	0
	603,269	3	9

The Importance of this Island is not, like that of some other of our Possessions, a Subject of political Reasonings, and a Topic of idle Speculation. Here is a commercial Object of above 600,000 *l.* yearly Value. It would be as ridiculous, as unjust, to accuse the Writer of a partial Attachment to, or a fond Preference of,



of, this Object, since the Greatness of it is no longer a Matter of Opinion, but of Account, and of an Account too most moderately stated, since it does not take in the whole Value of that Island, but of its Exports to *England* only, as that alone could hitherto be exactly ascertained.

But I must inform the Reader, 1st. That the two principal Ports of *Scotland*, *Glasgow* and *Leith*, have carried on a very considerable Trade with this Island.

2dly. That the Inhabitants of *Guadaloupe* continue to carry on a greater Trade, than any *English* Island does, with *North America*, where they dispose of their Molasses, as they have not as yet fallen into the Method of making Rum, which the Policy of *France* did not suffer her Islands to make, lest that Spirit should interfere with the Brandies of *France*; but certainly this will be a very considerable Article of Export from *Guadaloupe* to *Great Britain*, if we retain that Island.

3dly. In this Year the Enemy took a great Number of Ships, and some very valuable ones, coming from *Guadaloupe* to *England*. I am sure it will be a very moderate Computation to state them at no more than 50,000*l*. Whatever the Value of them might have been, the Reader must see that there is just so much Loss to the Table I have given above of the Exports of *Guadaloupe* to *England*.

These three Articles, though it is impossible

to ascertain their just Extent, are yet necessarily to be taken into the Account of the Value of *Guadaloupe*. They are as much Facts, though not accurately defined, as any one Article stated in the Account itself.

In every Argument concerning the Commerce of the *West-Indies*, it is common to lay the principal Stress upon the Sugar Produce. It is certainly relied on with great Reason, because being a gross Commodity, it increases our Tonnage: Being low in its original Price, it becomes a proper Basis for heavy Duties, and being of very large Demand, must have a proportionable Effect in the general Ballance of Trade. But this I apprehend is not much disputed. The Importance of this Article is indeed so highly rated, that our *West-Indian* Plantations are, in common Acceptation, considered merely as Sugar Islands; the Advocates for an Extent of Territory, in that Part of the World, have hitherto dwelt almost wholly upon the Benefit of supplying foreign Markets with this Commodity.

But without derogating at all from the Value of this rich Production, there is another Article, the Produce of the *West-Indies* in general, and of *Guadaloupe* in particular, which I think not inferior even to Sugar (possibly it may be of still greater commercial Consequence) and to which I therefore wish more immediately to direct the Reader's Attention. I mean Cotton; of which we see *Guadaloupe* sent us last Year to the Value of 112,792l. 10s.

Our

Our Manufactures employ annually about 13,000 Bags of this Commodity. Before the Acquisition of *Guadaloupe*, our own Colonies did by no Means answer our Demands ; our great Supply came from the *Levant*. For the greatest Part therefore of all the Cotton we used, we depended upon Strangers ; we depended upon a Country so frequently infested with the Plague, that nothing could be more precarious than the Supply : we depended upon a Country too, to which we sent but a small Proportion of our Manufactures, and a vast Ballance in ready Money.

These Disadvantages in the Supply of Cotton from the *Levant*, deserve our most serious Attention, as they strike sometimes at the very Being of a considerable Manufacture, and at all times keep it in a precarious and dependent State ; for as often as the Crops in the East happened to fail, as they frequently did, we have in that Case before this War, been always supplied from the *French West-Indian* Islands through the Hands of the *Dutch*, who, as they supplied the Market, so of Consequence they regulated the Price, and allowed the Cotton to us only at such an advanced Rate, as made it impossible for us to carry our Manufactures to Market on equal Terms with themselves, and much less with the *French*.

The Report of the House of Commons upon the Application of those concerned in the Cotton and Linnen Manufacture, about twelve Years ago, throws a great Light upon this Subject.

The Report sets forth, that a great Part of the Manufactures of *Lancashire*, are composed of Cotton and of Linnen Yarn, and that the *Dutch* and *French* have the Linnen Yarn at a much cheaper Rate than our *English* Manufacturers. Now it is certain, that nothing but the low Price of Cotton can enable us to afford so high a Price for Linnen Yarn; for if we must pay an high Price for each of the two *only* Materials which compose this Manufacture, it is impossible for us to go to Market with either the Cotton or the mixed Commodity on a Par with those who command the Materials of both at their own Price. This is no Speculation, we know from Experience what we actually have suffered by this Defect in our Colonies. About twelve Years ago, on account of a Plague in the *Levant*, our Import of Cotton from thence became altogether insufficient to answer our Demands; our own *West-Indies* could by no Means make up the Deficiency. In this our Emergency, the *Dutch*, as appears from the Report of that Committee, bestirred themselves with such Activity, Boldness, and Success, as to threaten the Destruction of all our Manufactures which depended on Cotton.

A like Failure happened in the Crops of the *Levant* in 1760. We did not that Year import above 1,900 Bags from the *Levant*, from whence in some Years we imported 10,000; but was the Consequence the same last Year as in the same Circumstances it had been twelve Years before? far from it: *Guadaloupe* in this Emergency threw 5,013 Bags of Cotton into our Scale, which

was

was then on the Point of kicking the Beam, and our Manufactures have uninterruptedly proceeded. The Schemes of Monopoly formed by the *Dutch* were baffled, though they had in the Year 1761 ten times their former Advantages, and were not under the Necessity as formerly in ‡ armed Vessels to force a Trade with the *French*, who, instead of opposing them, now invited them to their Market. *Guadaloupe* then, I say, broke the Measures of the *Dutch*, and in this very last Year rescued a considerable Manufacture from impending Ruin. In that Year *Guadaloupe* produced 5000 Bags, which is double the Quantity of Cotton which *Jamaica*, the greatest and richest of our Islands, ever produced in one Year. That wealthy and flourishing Island sent home in that Year but 2125 Bags, not half the Produce of *Guadaloupe*; and by Retrospect for several Years to the Produce of *Jamaica*, it is evident that the Cotton Produce of that Island rather declines than increases; a Circumstance which seems, I think, plainly to mark in that Island some natural

‡ Vide p. 21. of the Report from the Committee relating to the chequered and striped Linnens in the Year 1751, there is this Extract from a Letter from *Antigua*.

*Antigua, Feb. 4, 1750-1.*

“ Governor Heyliger has already engaged the greater Part  
 “ of what Cotton is made in the Danish Islands, Santa Cruz,  
 “ St. John’s, St. Thomas, besides the vast Quantities  
 “ of that Commodity he daily imports at St. Eustatia from the  
 “ French Islands in three large Sloops of his, that force a  
 “ Trade with the Inhabitants of the French Islands.---He is  
 “ at this Expence to come at Cotton.”



natural or political Unfitness for this Production ; whereas the Growth of Cotton in *Guadaloupe* continually increases ; and I may venture to assert, that there is an high Probability if kept in our Hands, that this Article, as well as every other, will at least double, since not a Third of the Land convenient to Ports and capable of Cultivation is yet cleared, and scarce any is fully slaved.

In one Word, this single Article of *Guadaloupian* Produce, is near treble the Value of all the Produce of all the Acquisitions we were to have made by Treaty ; and, did it produce nothing else, it is, even in this respect, a most desirable Object.

If therefore it be our Interest with as much Cheapness, with as great Certainty, and with as little Disadvantage as possible in the Ballance of Trade, to furnish ourselves with Cotton, it is as plain, that this can be done effectually, only by retaining in our Hands, and by improving to the utmost of our Abilities, those Places, which, from the present State of their actual Export, discover an Aptitude in the Soil, and in the Disposition of the Inhabitants, to raise a Commodity so necessary to our Manufactures.

If we had as minutely informed ourselves concerning the Importance of this Conquest, as a People attentive to their Interest, and jealous of their commercial Advantages, ought to have done, we could hardly have thought of affording *Guadaloupe* so low a Place in the Scale of our Acquisitions.

The

The ingenious Author of the *Interest* was of opinion, that the Acquisition of *Guadaloupe* could prove no Remedy for the \* Scantiness of Land so justly complained of, even by himself, in our *West-Indies*. I hope he will now be induced to change his Opinion, when he finds that the Produce of this Colony alone is already worth above 600,000l. a Year; that it is very near equal to the Produce of all the rest of the *English* *Leward* Islands; that even last Year it amounted to more than a Third of the Whole of what we imported from all our old *West-India* Plantations put together. It is very well known to every Gentleman in that Trade, that the Produce of *Guadaloupe* has this Year exceeded the Produce of the last, as the Produce of the last did that of the Year before; and as probably the next will the Produce of this. In the *English* Hands it will be, for an Age to come, the very best Market for Slaves; and will for ever continue a very good one, not only for that Article but for the Consumption of all Sorts of *British* Manufactures.

Another Conjecture of this ingenious Writer's on this Subject, is likewise overturned by Fact. He is of Opinion, that probably † none, or a  
H very

\* *Vide* Int. Page 46. "Though I am far from thinking we have Sugar Land enough, I cannot think *Guadaloupe* is so desirable an Increase of it."

† Int. of Col. Page. 46, speaking of our keeping *Guadaloupe*, and exporting its Sugars, he says, "Perhaps the amazing Increase of English Consumption, might stop most of it here."

very small Quantity, of the Sugars of *Guadaloupe* will be exported. If he will give himself the Trouble to enquire, he will find that they are nearly *all* exported, together with the whole of the Coffee, of which Commodity we see this Island produces to the Value of 66,261 l. 16 s. 3 d.

But if neither Sugar, nor Coffee, were exported, but the Whole of each Commodity was employed in the Home Consumption; yet would it not be still a very material Point, that our own Products in one Part of our Dominions, should pay for our Products in another, instead of our being obliged to pay ready Money for them in foreign Markets?

Here I must remark with some Concern a Mistake, which the same ingenious Writer has been, I know not how, led into; namely, that this Island will not take off above † 100,000 l. of our Manufactures.

If the Trade of *Guadaloupe* were in Reality confined within even those narrow Limits, I conceive, that the entire Carriage, and mercantile Profit, of 603,269 l. 3 s. 9 d. of Produce, the Use of above 5,000 Bags of Cotton for our Manufactures, and the certain Consumption of even 100,000 l. of our *British* Commodities, would make this a most valuable Conquest, and worthy of our most serious Attention. But on what

† Int. of Col. Page 47. “ *Though our own Colonies expend among us almost the whole Produce of our Sugar, can we, or ought we, to promise ourselves this will be the Case? In Guadaloupe, 100,000 l. will supply them with British Manufactures.*”

what Grounds has this Author been pleased to circumscribe the Export to *Guadaloupe* within these Limits? Fact in this, as in all his other Predictions, speaks directly against him. The Negroes, sold there this Year, are not fewer than 4,000; which, at only 30 l. a Head, amounts to 120,000 l. In this single Article alone, we have 20,000 l. more than this Gentleman is pleased to allow to the whole Consumption of *British* Manufactures. I speak of Negroes as perfectly equivalent to *British* Manufactures, or to Commodities exported from *Great Britain* on Account of *Guadaloupe*; for whether the *British* Export is sent to *Guadaloupe*, or exchanged in *Africa* for Slaves for the use of *Guadaloupe*, certainly the Export from hence is equally to be put to the Account of *Guadaloupe*. I have not been able to procure the Export from *Great Britain*, correspondent in point of Time to the Import given above; but in the Year 1760, the very Year after the Reduction of the Island, the direct Export from hence had already amounted to 118,569 l. 5 s. 10 d. and I must desire the Reader to observe, that *Guadaloupe* has, besides, been the Market for all the *French* Prize Goods taken in the *West-Indies*. The Precision, however, which I have prescribed to myself, precludes me from bringing this into the Account, as it is impossible here to ascertain exactly the Value or Quantity of those Goods, which has however been very considerable. But exclusive of these

Prize Goods, and admitting, contrary to fact, the immediate Export from hence, to have been no greater for the last, or for the current, Year than what I have stated for the first Year after its Reduction; yet this, joined to the *British* Export employed for *Guadaloupe* in the Slave Trade, (which I have under calculated) will raise the Demand of *British* Produce and Labour, occasioned by our Possession of this Island, to 238,569*l.* 5*s.* 10*d.* and to this if we add, as we must, the Freightage, the Commission, the Merchant's Profit on the Sale of the *British* Commodities there, and the returned Advantages of all the Produce in the Import hither, and in the Re-export abroad, in the Manufacture at home, and in the Expence of those who come to *London* on their Affairs, it will appear to a Demonstration how extremely lucrative to *England* this Island is, even in its present State of imperfect Subjection and imperfect Cultivation. In this Manner conjectures are answered by Facts; and when this Writer speaks of a Conquest over a † People of different Language, Manners, and Religion, as not worth having; and of its Value as overballanced by the Expence of keeping it, he must allude to some other Conquest; and not  
to

† *Vide* Int. Page 46. “ *A Country fully inhabited by any Nation, is no proper Possession for another of different Language, Manner, and Religion: It is hardly ever tenable at less Expence than it is worth.*”



to *Guadaloupe* ; for we know that the Expence of keeping *Guadaloupe*, even now in Time of War, and when the Island is entirely *French*, is infinitely inferior to the Advantages which we derive from its Commerce. No Difficulty is found in keeping the unwarlike *West-Indian French*, in due Obedience. On a Peace our Situation will be still more favourable. I venture to say, that one Regiment will be fully sufficient for its internal Defence.

This Author indeed, knows, that with *Canada* in our Possession we must still for hundreds of Miles border on the *French*, or *Spaniards* † ; “ That the People inhabiting the Frontiers, “ are generally the Refuse of both Nations, remote “ from the Eye, the Prudence, and the Restraint of Government.” He knows and “ tells us, that a || “ vast Wilderness, thinly or “ scarce at all peopled, conceals with Ease the “ March of Troops and Workmen. Important “ Passes may be seized within our Limits” ; and knowing all this, his Apprehensions for the vast Expence, necessary to retain a conquered Country, if applied to *Canada*, are reasonable and well-founded ; but if applied to *Guadaloupe*, they are altogether ill-founded and unreasonable. It is extraordinary, that so ingenious, so sensible a Man should so confound all Ideas as to suppose, the same Dangers, which may exist in *Canada*, a vast, wild, uncommercial, inland Country, of an extensive Frontier, and retired from the Eye of Government, are

to

† Vide, *Int. Page 9.* || *Vide Int. Page 5.*

to be at all dreaded in *Guadaloupe*, an Island, divided from every Neighbour, and where all lies immediately under the Eye of Government; a Country, which is one great Scene of Commerce, and which holds not one single Circumstance in common with *Canada*. *Guadaloupe*, in the natural Course of Things, must in a few Years be almost wholly *English*; and, if such is the Consumption of our Manufactures in its present imperfect State of Culture, whilst the Idea of their being restored to *France* preserves a strong hold on the Imagination of the Inhabitants, and therefore restrains the Demand for *English* Manufactures; (a Restraint which must make them a very rich *immediate* \* Treasure indeed, to whichever Nation they may fall at the Conclusion of a Peace.) If such, I say, is already the Consumption of our Manufactures at *Guadaloupe* under these unfavourable Circumstances, what must it be, when the greater Part of the Inhabitants come to be *English*, and have no other Market, no other Government, to hope for? The Objections this Gentleman mentions, lie equally against every Conquest, which has hitherto been deemed valuable amongst

\* The *French* Inhabitants of *Guadaloupe* have most certainly at this Day in their Possession more Gold in Specie, than is to be found in all our other *Leward* Islands put together. The far greater Part of this Treasure must, immediately upon a Peace, of necessity in one Tide flow in upon that Country which shall then be Master of *Guadaloupe*.

amongst Mankind. According to such Politicians, we are not to take Advantage of the Industry and Wealth of new Subjects, because we must live in Fear of their Disaffection ; and they notably think, that Nations may be made great and powerful, upon Principles which are founded on Suspicion, and Cowardice.

This Writer, however, on maturer Deliberation, seems to give up, in some measure, his Objection, and acknowledges the Value of *Guadaloupe*, provided it be not || bought too dear. What does he think of *Minorca* as a proper Purchase for it, supposing we had not resolved to surrender it, without any Equivalent at all.

Let us come to the comparative Estimation of these Objects. We agreed to exchange an Island of 603,269l. 3 s. 9 d. annual Benefit to our Commerce, and a Burthen but of 20,000 l. to our Revenue, for one which yielded in Trade but 500 l. a Year ; and was a dead Weight on the national Fund of above 74,000 l. at the lowest. This is the true State of *Guadaloupe*, considered as an Equivalent for *Minorca* ; and the Publick is left to judge how far our commercial Interest was consulted, when  
one

|| *Vide* Int. Page 49. “ I have before said I do not deny  
“ the Utility of the Conquest, or even of our future Possession  
“ of *Guadaloupe*, if not bought too dear.---The Trade of the  
“ West-Indies is one of our most valuable Trades ; our Possessions there deserve our greatest Care and Attention.”

one was to be given in Exchange for the other.

I come now to consider, not only whether this particular Object, *Minorca*, but whether all the Acquisitions, which we were to have made by that Treaty, put together, can be considered as a just Equivalent for the Loss we should have sustained in the Surrender of *Gua-daloupe*.

These Acquisitions then were *Minorca*, *Canada*, and *Senegal*; together with the Isle of *Goree*.

The neutral Islands, *Dominique* and *Tobago*, cannot, as I have shewn, in common Sense be reckoned as Acquisitions made by that Treaty; for we yielded in their Place to *France* two others, *St. Lucie*, alone of infinitely more Consequence, and *St. Vincent*: These in their Place I shall consider more at large: At present I shall examine the Value of all the allowed Acquisitions.

Of *Minorca* I have already spoken, and the Enumeration of its commercial Advantages was quickly finished.

I shall now examine the Weight of *Canada* in the commercial Scale. To avoid incumbering the Discourse, I have thrown the Detail of the exported Produce of *Canada* into a Table. The Sum-total of the Export of *Canada* to *Great Britain* appears to consist principally

principally of Furs and Skins, and to be no more in Value than 14015 l. 17 s. 1 d. a Year.\*

\* An Account of the Quantities and different Species of Goods imported into *England* from *Canada* from *Christmas* 1760 to *Christmas* 1761.

		Amount of the Value		
Quantities		l.	s.	d.
46 tons 1 ct. 4 lb.	Brass wrought	162	0	0
437 lb.	Adiantum Nigrum	32	15	6
59 lb.	Balsam Natural	36	17	6
398 lb.	Castoreum	99	10	0
15 tons 6 ct. 3 lb.	Iron Bushell or Cast	38	5	1
120 ct.	Hoops	18	0	0
180 tons 1 hd. 19 g	Oil Train	2163	18	0
2,820 N <sup>o</sup>	Bear Black	916	10	0
39,732 N <sup>o</sup>	Beaver	6953	2	0
2,624 N <sup>o</sup>	Buck or Deer in Hair	426	8	0
22 N <sup>o</sup>	Callabar	0	3	8
2,169 N <sup>o</sup>	Catt	18	1	6
14,801 N <sup>o</sup>	Deer <i>India</i> $\frac{1}{2}$ drest	925	1	3
625 N <sup>o</sup>	Eik	203	2	6
513 N <sup>o</sup>	Fisher	14	19	3
1,458 N <sup>o</sup>	Fox Ordinary	91	2	6
13,565 N <sup>o</sup>	Martin	452	3	4
223 N <sup>o</sup>	Martron	7	8	8
358 N <sup>o</sup>	Mink	34	3	10
1 N <sup>o</sup>	Moose	0	2	9
7,220 N <sup>o</sup>	Musquash	180	10	0
2,972 N <sup>o</sup>	Otter	520	3	0
18,112 N <sup>o</sup>	Raccoon	452	16	0
670 N <sup>o</sup>	Seal	30	14	2
503 N <sup>o</sup>	Wolf	125	15	0
146 N <sup>o</sup>	Wolvering	58	8	0
25 lb.	Snuff	2	3	9
98 gal.	Spirits Rum	8	3	4
3 lb.	Whalefins	6	0	0
10 l.	A Clock	10	0	0
10l. 11s. 6d.	Goods several Sorts	10	11	6
122 lb.	Skins Beaver cutt	16	5	0
48 ells.	Sails Foreign made	0	12	0
		14,015 17 1		



The Reader, habituated to the Declamations with which the Publick have been so often amused on the Subject of *Canada*, will undoubtedly be somewhat surprized at the inconsiderable Value of this immensely extensive Country ; I believe that those Traders who, deluded by the popular Cry in favour of *Canada*, ventured to send some Cargoes thither, have had reason heartily to repent their Credulity. For my Part I never entertained a very high Opinion of its Importance in any, much less in a trading, Light. Yet the precise State of its Commerce has fallen below my own mean Opinion of its Value ; it is even below the Income of very many private Estates : And here let it be remembered, that this Deficiency, in the direct Trade between *Canada* and *Great Britain*, is not compensated, as in our old northern Colonies, by an extensive Traffick to the *West-Indies*. The Trade between *Canada* and the Islands is absolutely none ; and it has happened exactly as I at first foresaw, that whatever little Trade of this Kind was carried on whilst *Canada* continued in the Possession of *France*, must be lost and at an end, as soon as ever *Canada* became an *English* Possession. The entire Produce of this Province might be imported hither in one single Ship ; and this is the whole existing Value of *Canada* to the Commerce and Navigation of *Great Britain*. 14,000 l. to the former ; a Ship or two at most to the latter.

The last of the Acquisitions, which we were

to have made by that Treaty, was *Senegal* and *Goree*. Properly speaking these Settlements are not to be considered as Acquisitions by *Conquest*, but by Purchase. We did not retain them under the *uti possidetis*; but we were to have acquired them by the Cession on our Part of some other Places, on the Coast of *Africa*: But let them stand as real Conquests, and let us consider their Importance. The Value of *Senegal* and *Goree* arises principally from their supplying us with Gums, which we were before obliged to take from the *French*. By this Acquisition we also add something to our Supply of Slaves. It may, however, be observed, that *Senegal* does not supply very many Slaves; and that those brought from thence are, of all the *Africans*, the least adapted to Labour, and consequently bear the lowest Price at the *West-India* Markets.

It is not in my Power to be quite as exact as I could wish in this Particular; however, I have not neglected to acquire the best Information possible. None of my Accounts raise the Number of Slaves, exported from *Senegal* in any Year, to more than 1000; and at the best Price their Value at Market will not exceed 30,000 l. The Gum, we receive annually from *Senegal*, may be worth about 7000 l.

The following Table, therefore, will shew in one View the Value of the Acquisitions we were to have made by that Treaty, and the Price we were to have paid for them; and whether all these Acquisitions put together, could be

considered as an Equivalent for the Loss we should have sustained in the Surrender of *Guadaloupe*. By the late Treaty

We should have acquired			We should have lost		
	l.	s. d.		l.	s. d.
<i>Canada</i> , worth annually } 14,015 17 1			<i>Guadaloupe</i> , worth annually } 603,269 3 9		
<i>Minorca</i> , ditto, } 500					
<i>Senegal</i> and <i>Goree</i> } 37,000					
<hr/>			<hr/>		
Total Acquisition per Ann. } 51,515 17 1					
Net Loss per Ann. } 551,753 6 8					
<hr/>			<hr/>		
	603,269	3 9		603,269	3 9

Commercially therefore we should have lost by the Bargain above 550,000 l. a Year, and have purchased what we retained at more than ten times their Value.

But if we take into the Consideration the Expence of keeping these Acquisitions respectively, the Account will then stand thus :

In * <i>Canada</i> one Regiment	£. 20,000
In <i>Senegal</i> and <i>Goree</i> one	20,000
In <i>Minorca</i> four Regiments	74,000

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114,000

To this Charge, if we oppose even the whole gross Value of the Trade of all these Places, there will be found an Over-balance of Expence more than Profit to the Amount, in time of profoundest Peace, of 62,484l. 2s. 1 d. whereas,

\* I believe the Reader will see that I stated this Account most excessively in Favour of *Canada*, by only charging *Canada* with the same Force I did to *Guadaloupe*.

whereas, allowing the same Force to be kept up in *Guadaloupe* as I have allowed for *Canada*, and deducting accordingly 20,000 l. from the Value of the Produce of that Island, there will be still a Ballance in Favour of *Guadaloupe* of 583,269 l. 3 s. 9 d.

So that, on making the best of the Bargain, we must lose considerably by retaining all the Territories we were to have acquired by that Treaty. The only Object by which we did, or in the Nature of Things we could, gain any thing, we thought proper to give away without any Compensation at all.

Were we to consume at Home the whole Produce of *Guadaloupe*, the very Duties raised on that Produce would amount to more than the whole gross Produce of all the rest of the Acquisitions which we were to have made by that Treaty.

But the Fact is, that the whole, except the Cotton, is exported, and the Cotton is employed in our Manufactures; the rest of the Produce, which I say is exported, is consequently to be placed on the Credit Side of the Account of our foreign Trade.

I imagine some melancholy Reflections must arise in the Mind of every Person the least intelligent in, or concerned for, the Interest of his Country, when he considers the immense humiliating Reverse of Fortune, which a few Days would have made in the Affairs of *Great Britain* and *France*, if Peace had been concluded on those Terms. *France* would have got rid of a Territory, which she

she could neither keep without Expence, nor enlarge without Danger, and she would in return at the same Time have re-entered into Possession of a most extensive and flourishing Trade, worth at least three Millions annually, now either possessed by us, or useless to her, by which she would have been enabled in a short Time to repair the Breaches of this War, to pay her Debts, to enlarge her Resources, and to breed up a Number of Seamen for the Re-establishment of her Navy: Whilst the *English*, giving a great Part of this very Trade out of their Hands, and incumbered with a Debt of a great deal above 100 Millions, acquired only a barren Expence of 62,484 l. a Year, without one single, even possible, Advantage to our Commerce; without any other Consolation than the Liberty of parading in boundless and fruitless Forests, and amusing ourselves with idle Speculations upon the Importance of *Canada*.

I have not valued the two neutral Islands, which were to have been left us, in this Estimate. In common Sense they cannot be considered as Acquisitions, unless you say you acquire when you give away; however, I think it neither wholly unnecessary to my Purpose, nor altogether useless to the Reader, to enter a little into a Detail of the Value of these Islands. In order more fully to display the Fallacy and Unfairness of the *French* Proceeding in the late Negotiation, when they presumed to call any Division of those Islands equitable, while they insisted upon retaining *St. Lucie*.



Of these, called neutral Islands, *Tobago*, the most Southward, is absolutely wild, covered with Woods, inhabited only by a few *Caraibs*.

*St. Vincent* is neither so small, nor so covered with Woods; nor is it thinly inhabited; but mark well what the Inhabitants are: They are first *Caraibs*, to the Number of about 7000; and next, free Negroes, to the Number of about 8000: These two people are free, and both remarkably jealous of their Freedom.

The *French* imagine themselves, and possibly not altogether without Reason, better adapted than we are to maintain a friendly Correspondence with Savages. They have not, however, notwithstanding this Advantage, ever ventured one single Sugar Establishment in this Island; and indeed those, who are acquainted with the Nature of such Establishments, know how totally opposite such a Neighbourhood is to the Existence of a Sugar Settlement, which is not like a landed Estate at Home. Its Value does not consist in the Land, but in the Number and Goodness of the Slaves, in the Strength and Convenience of the Mills, and other Buildings; all very expensive in the Construction, and which notwithstanding may be all destroyed, and the Slaves cut off or carried away, in a single Night, by any sudden Incurfion. A Man has not his Estate impaired and damaged, but actually annihilated. No Sugar Colony ever yet flourished, which was not cleared of the *Caraibs*; so that you must either have pursued the detestable

and dangerous Policy of extirpating the old Inhabitants, or have received a mere nominal Possession, without any Advantage from *St. Vincent*.

But it was, in Reality, a Matter of great Indifference to the *French*, which of the other neutral Islands you chose, or if you chose all the other three, if you left them *St. Lucie*.

They were well aware of the real intrinsic Value of this Island, and of the real Insignificance of all the rest. This Island contains about one thousand Men capable of bearing Arms; they grow a great Quantity of Cotton; the Land in general is extremely good. No Island in the *West-Indies* has a better Harbour, nor a greater Plenty of Rivers; add to this, that its Situation made it of inestimable Value to *France*, because in time of War it forms a Sort of Barrier to *Martinique*, at least in our Hands it would be the Door to open our Way to *Martinique*; it lies just to the Windward of, and not seven Leagues distant from, *Martinique*.

If our Object was to have kept from the *French* an Island, by its Situation of Consequence to them, *St. Lucie* of all the neutral Islands was the one not to be allowed to *France*; and if it was our Object to acquire an Island by its Commerce or Situation of Consequence to us, we should never have thought of *Dominique*; this Island, the last of the four neutral ones, has more *Caraibs*, and is little more cleared, than *Tobago* itself; but even, if its intrinsic Value had been worth Attention, its Situation between the two great Islands of *Guadaloupe* and *Martinique*, would render it, whilst  
both

both these great Islands were in the Hands of *France*, of no possible Advantage or Service to us. The Moment a War should be proclaimed, not a single Ship could attempt to go into, or sail out of *Dominique*, without falling into the Hands of the *French*. *Martinique* lies exactly in the Way to intercept every thing going from *Europe* to *Dominique*, as *Guadaloupe* does for intercepting every thing coming out of *Dominique* to *Europe*; if indeed *Guadaloupe* remained to us, that Circumstance would give some Importance to *Dominique*, which lying to the Windward of *Guadaloupe*, as *St. Lucie* lies to *Martinique*, might, if we could forget the Difference of intrinsic Value, be of the same Service in covering our Possessions; but if *Guadaloupe* is given up, I do insist upon it, that not one, no, nor all of the other neutral Islands are worth our taking, except *St. Lucie*; and if *St. Lucie* was of such Importance to *France*, that she could not part with it, she could not have refused paying well for it; and therefore must it not astonish the Reader to find, that, when we generously made so great, so important a Concession, to which on the Terms of an equal Partition, she was no way intitled, we did not take that favourable Opportunity of working on the Gratitude of the *French*, since we could not on their Justice, to beseech them not to dictate to us too like Conquerors; to tell them, that, if *St. Lucie* was necessary to cover their great Island of *Martinique*; *Guadaloupe*, even in that Idea, was full as necessary to

cover our || *Leward Islands*; that they had not more Right to one, than we had to the other. If this Reasoning did not prevail, might we not have imitated their own Language concerning *Belleisle*? If you think the neutral Islands of such real Value, you are free to keep them, and we will content ourselves with *Guadaloupe*. Ought we not to have made a Bargain, since we could not make an Acquisition? if we were not to take Advantage of our Conquests, we ought, methinks, to have made some Advantage of our Concessions.

If we miss this critical Moment, and should one Day find ourselves to have been mistaken in our Ideas of the *West-Indies*; our Mistake in all human Probability will be for ever irretrievable. The *French*, who trusted too much in the natural Strength of their Islands, and were lulled into Security by the idle Boast of their Planters, had not during this War either in *Martinico* or *Guadaloupe*, a regular Force of one thousand Men. They now see their Error, and cannot in a future War omit to correct it; and then they may perhaps find  
Means

|| *Guadaloupe* lies to the *Leward* of *Antigua*, *Nevis*, *Monferrat*, *St. Kitts*, and all that Cluster of small *English* Islands, and consequently those Islands are most liable to be attacked from thence, if it returns to *France*, and this Island is most capable of protecting them if it remains in our Hands. It is certainly very extraordinary that all should be sacrificed to the Idea of Security, in *North America*, where we were infinitely stronger than the *French*, and that no Notion of Danger should be entertained for our valuable Possessions in the *West-Indies*, where we are infinitely weaker than the *French*. I



Means to make a better Defence in their connected Islands, two of them larger each than all our *Leward* Islands put together, than we may be able to do in our small, dispersed, Scraps of defenceless Land. In Reality, the *French* Possessions, in that Part of *America*, seem to be the Result of Deliberation and System, and to have been formed by a People, who had both a full Freedom of Choice, and Power to enforce it; our Possessions, on the contrary, are irregular, unconnected, and seem to have been occupied as derelict, or as stolen; and not as Choice pointed out, but as Occasion and Necessity would admit.

I have, I hope, fully demonstrated, that the Acquisition of *Guadaloupe* alone is not only superior to that of *Minorca*, which alone was put into the Scale against it, but far superior in Value to every thing else united, which we should have acquired by that Treaty, upon any of those Plans the Enemy proposed, or even upon those, which we drew up *agreeably to our own Desires*.

I shall now, conformably to the Plan I prescribed to myself at first setting out, endeavour to ascertain, and to observe upon, the Causes that may have induced us to overlook the glaring Advantages, which resulted from our Possession of *Guadaloupe*, and to enter into a Barter so strangely disproportionate, as that of *Guadaloupe* for *Minorca*.

I must previously observe, that no Man can have a Disposition more remote from the Desire of intermixing any thing personal in



this Discussion. No Man has a more sincere Veneration for the Dignity, or greater Respect for the Abilities, of the Persons, who were supposed to have been concerned in that Negotiation; but it will be easily allowed, that the most extensive Mind, occupied with a Variety of great Objects, may possibly overlook some minute Details. To blame for not being attentive to every thing, is not to accuse any particular Man, but human Nature itself. The most important Consequences, however, may sometimes depend upon such Details, and it may be lawful to rectify, where it would be criminal to reproach. The Truth is, that neither the whole, nor any Part, of the Administration is justly culpable for this Mistake; those Persons alone are to blame, who, for Reasons best known to themselves, by inflammatory Declamations, by idle Suggestions of Danger, and by Suggestions of Profit still more frivolous, turned the Eyes and Thoughts of the Publick from their true Interest; those Men, therefore, and those alone, are responsible to their Country, and to their Conscience, for obtruding on the Publick a System, which some of them might, and others of them must have known, to be totally destitute of any *one* rational Foundation.

We ought not to forget, who they were that joined this Cry, and swelled it into such a tumultuous Loudness. Many Persons, from having been jealous Rivals of, and sometimes very determined Enemies, to the Prosperity of our *North American Colonies*, all at once fell into the

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the most affected and ridiculous Solitude for their Safety; they pretended to think, and had Craft enough to make others really believe, that, whilst the *French* retained any footing in *Canada*, we could not be for an Hour secure of our Northern Settlements; that our People would be in continual Danger of being destroyed by inhuman Massacres, and their Possessions of being wasted by Fire and Sword; that, in short, without securing every Part of all *French Canada*, let the Value of our other Acquisitions be ever so great, our *North American* Colonies would tell us, we had done nothing; and with such surprizing Industry was this absurd Clamour propagated, that *Canada* came at last to take an entire Possession of our Hearts and Understandings; and we were taught to believe, that no Cession was too great to purchase this inestimable Security, this immoveable Barrier of all our Colonies; nay, they carried the Point much further, and pretended, that, if we were once in Possession of this Territory, we had little else to desire for the future Prosperity both of the Mother Country, and her Colonies.

This very groundless Opinion was the true Source of our Neglect, in the late Negotiation, of such real, commercial Advantages, as might augment the Resources of *Great Britain*. And from hence proceeded that utter Oblivion of all former Maxims of our Policy, whilst, under the Name of Security, we sought with Eagerness extensive and unprofitable Empire, and rejected moderate but lucrative Acquisition. This Error, if it should continue to gain Ground, may  
prove

prove more detrimental to us, than the Loss of any particular Object, or, perhaps, than all the Objects of this Negotiation. It may by Degrees infect the whole System of our national Policy. I hope therefore, that it will not be thought either tedious or impertinent, if I endeavour to unravel the intricate and fraudulent Scheme, by which we were first drawn into this Error; and to shew, that the first-born, the favourite Offspring of this new System, was of little Value either in itself, or for those Purposes, for which it was pretended to be so necessary.

I do not say that *Canada*, which *France* has thrown upon us, should be again thrown back upon her; but we ought not to suffer ourselves to be so grossly deluded on this Subject, as to imagine, that in this Cession she has lost, or that we have gained any thing so essential, as should induce us to acquiesce in the Surrender of every other Advantage, or in the Neglect of every other rational Pursuit. The Points, which it was incumbent on the Advocates for *Canada* to have proved, were, I conceive, these three.

*First*, That the Possession of *French Canada* was any great Acquisition to our national Strength, either absolutely, or in Preference to other Objects.

*Secondly*, That our Colonies could not have had a rational Security, without the Possession of all *Canada*.

*Thirdly*, That the Possession of *Canada*, in-tire, could give them that kind of Security, for which they desired it.

I apprehend they have proved none of these three, which are the material, Points ; and I hope to shew that they cannot prove them.

I do not know that the able Writer, whose Steps I have hitherto attended, or any other, has made a single direct Assertion in Favour of the commercial Advantages of *Canada*. Indeed the whole Skill and Mastery of those, who managed that Side of the Question, consisted in two Artifices : First, In palpably mis-stating the Question, by supposing that those, who thought other Objects more desirable than *Canada*, were for including, under the Denomination of *Canada*, every thing which lay beyond the Mountains. But the Fact was quite otherwise ; that Scheme, which opposed the Necessity of our retaining all *Canada*, proposed our acquiring the whole of *Nova Scotia*, the whole Country to the River *St. Laurence*, and thence all along the Southward of the Lakes, and to the *Mississippi*, or at least to the River *St. Jerome*. These Boundaries, they were of Opinion, gave them an immense Enlargement of Territory ; and, indeed, every thing either of Strength or Value in *North America*. Having secured these, they were of Opinion, that, if the *French* should afterwards hold out their contracted and crippled *Canada*, as an Indemnification for any of our valuable Conquests, we ought rather to leave it to them, than to make so disadvantageous a Change. This was the real Scheme proposed, and that which they, who wanted to confine our whole Attention to *Canada*, ought to have opposed ; but  
they



they opposed a Phantom of their own raising; and argued as if there was no Medium between not acquiring *Canada*, and acquiring nothing. As they contracted, in this confused Way of speaking, the Ideas of their Adversaries, so by the same Confusion they enlarged their own; and consequently argued as if the Acquisition of *Canada*, and of all *North America*, was one and the same thing: This was the First of their Arts.

The Second was, dwelling, in Season and out of Season, on the general Value of our present Commerce with *North America*; and leaving it to the Reader, if he pleased, to draw a Conclusion in Favour of further Acquisitions there; and particularly in Favour of *Canada*, which happens to be in that Part of the World.

But this general and confused Method of Reasoning, so favourable to Deceit and Imposition, must also be quitted, before we can come to any precise and accurate Ideas on this Question.

The general Name of *North America* is apt, and it is so intended by the *Panegyrist*s of *Canada*, to mislead us into an Opinion, that all the Colonies, included in that common Name, partake of the same common Circumstances, and trade with us upon the same Terms. Nothing can, however, be more fallacious than this Notion. Our Colonies, on that vast Continent, are of two Kinds, and under Circumstances extremely different from each other; and we can never reason concerning them with  
any



any tolerable Precision, without keeping this Distinction continually before us. By the Means of this Distinction, we may be enabled to acquire somewhat juster Ideas of our Colony Interests; than we seem to have hitherto entertained; and even, as Matter of Speculation, these Enquiries are not wholly unworthy the Regard and Study of every literate *Englishman*.

The Colonies to the Northward, on this Continent, are *Nova Scotia*, the four Provinces of *New England*, *New York*, *Pensilvania*, and the two *Jersey's*. All these have very little direct Trade with *Great Britain*: I mean they have nothing, with which they can repay us for the Commodities they draw from hence: They only trade with *England* circuitously; either through the *West-Indies*, which is to us the most advantageous Part of their Trade; or through foreign *European* Countries, which, however necessary, is a dangerous and suspicious Channel. Our *English* Ships meet theirs with the same Commodities, at the same Markets; and, if these Markets happen to be overstocked, we interfere with, and consequently hurt, each other. But what is still more material, there is much Reason to suspect, that no small Part of the Benefit of our *North American* Trade is, by this Means, lost to the Mother Country, and passes to Foreigners, and sometimes to Enemies. These northern Provinces are in Effect not subject to the Act of Navigation, or to the other Acts, which have since increased the Number of enumerated Commodities, because excepting only some Furs,

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they do not trade in any such Commodities. They are therefore neither obliged directly to bring their Goods to *England*; nor, when they have carried them to other Countries, are they necessitated to take *England* in their Way home. Whereas all the Colonies, which produce any of the enumerated Commodities, under whatever Relaxations, are always subject to the one or other of these Regulations. For Instance, Ships from *Boston* may carry Fish, Corn, and Provisions, to *France* or *Italy*, and return again directly to *Boston*, loaden with foreign Commodities, subject to no other Check than what must be considered as none, that of a Custom-house Officer in their own Colony.

But the southern Colonies of this same Continent, I mean *Virginia*, *Maryland*, the *Carolinas*, and *Georgia*, are under quite different Circumstances. They produce many Commodities, which are immediately demanded at the *English* Market, such as Tobacco, Rice, and Indigo; all which, being enumerated in the Act of Navigation, must, according to that Act, be brought to the *English* Market, and to no other. And in the Act, which permits some of these Commodities to be sent under some Restrictions to the Countries South of *Cape Finisterre*, a Precaution is inserted, that the Vessels, concerned in that Trade, must take *Great Britain* in their Way home; by which they are effectually prevented from making their Returns, or any Part of them, in foreign Merchandize.

But

But to set more clearly before the Reader the Difference between those two kinds of Colonies, I must observe, that *New England*, the most populous of our Settlements, sent hither in 1761, Commodities to the Value only of 25,985l. 8s. 11d. *New York* only 21,684l. 10s. 3d. and *Pensilvania* only 22,404l. 13s. 11d. But the Moment you pass this Line, which divides the Colonies to the Southward, the Case is at once extremely altered. *Virginia* and *Maryland* exported hither in that Year 357,228l. 7s. 4d. and *Carolina* 206,534l. 2s. 2d. If we look to our two new Colonies, or the two Extremities of that Continent to the North and South, this Difference will in Proportion be full as conspicuous. *Georgia* exported hither to the Value of 6,074l. 3s. 9d. This is indeed little; but *Nova Scotia*, tho' the Settlement there was planned with the utmost Wisdom, though a Million of Money has been already, within a very few Years, expended upon it, and though that enormous Sum has been applied with the most distinguished Oeconomy and Management, yet that Settlement has not hitherto been able to return Commodities to more than 18l. 3s. Value *per ann.* for that was the Whole of their last Year's Export.

The Southern continental Colonies, in their Commerce with us, bear a much nearer Resemblance to the *West-Indies*, than to their northern Neighbours; and an Augmentation of Territory, were it at all wanted, as it is not, in that Part of the World, would be there very near as desirable in a commercial Light,

as an Augmentation in the *West-Indies*. But the Acquisition of *Canada* is an Acquisition, not to these southern, but to the northern Provinces. From its Climate, it cannot trade with *Great Britain*, but in Furs, of which we have already seen the Value, because it can produce no other enumerated Commodity; and from its Situation, it is as nothing in the circuitous Trade with the *West-Indies*, by which our old northern Colonies are chiefly supported.

Whatever, therefore, is said, or insinuated, of the Advantages of *Canada*, by an Inference from the Advantage derived from our *North American* Colonies in general, is altogether groundless and fallacious. But to induce us the more easily to repose all our Desires, and to cast all our Cares upon *Canada*, they use another Art, which, though in strict Argument it is less than nothing, yet to those who propose it, serves useful Purposes; it tends to divert our Minds from the true State of the Question; they endeavour therefore to amuse us with an Expectation, that the vast Inland Tracts about the *Ohio*, removed from all maritime Communication by their Distance, and by the Interposition of great Mountains, may one Day be made greatly subservient to our Commerce by raising several useful Commodities, for which we have a Demand in *England*. In this Point, as in all others, relative to this important Question, they play most insufferably upon the supposed Ignorance, and Credulity, of their Readers.

In the first Place, they endeavour to prevail  
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on us to throw away extensive, existing, real, immediate Advantages, in Hopes of those which, even on their own stating, are but speculative, remotely future, contingent, and, if at all possible, depending upon a thousand Accidents. They flatter us, for Instance, with an Idea, that we shall one Time or other be able to raise raw Silk, and also with Profit to transport Hemp from the Heart of that remote Continent; when we know that this Commodity of Hemp in our old Settlements, in Climates full as favourable to its Growth, and in Situations near the Sea, and therefore infinitely more favourable to its Export, never has hitherto been cultivated to any Advantage, but has even resisted parliamentary Encouragements and Bounties, almost equal to its native Value, in such a Manner, that this Point seems at length to be given up by the Legislature as in Despair, and the Act for granting this ineffectual Bounty has been suffered to expire.

To the other Promise of raw Silk the same Answer may be given. When we find our maritime Colonies of *Carolina* and *Georgia*, which extend in Length 500 Miles, and as much in Breadth, which are far more favourable in their Situation, because more southern in their Climate, so abounding in this Produce, as not to be able to grow a sufficient Number of Mulberry Trees for their Worms, then, and not till then, it will be Time for us to think of looking for an Extent of Territory, in order to raise raw Silk; I am afraid this is a Speculation for a very late Posterity indeed.



It is really pleasant to observe an ingenious Theorist, straining at the highest Pitch of his Erudition to prove, what nobody has ever thought of disputing with him, that an Inland Commerce has been in former Ages, and is still carried on in many Parts of the World, to Advantage; I say it is pleasant, because he seldom thinks fit to mention the Commodities in which this Trade is carried on, nor the Circumstances of those who manage it; and consequently leaves us intirely at a Loss, in what Manner to apply those Facts to the Point in Question. In most of the Instances which he has produced, such an Explanation would make full against him. And, if I were not in Fear that I had already trespassed too much on the Reader's Patience, I could demonstrate, that Imagination can hardly carry Extremes to a greater Distance, than there is between the Examples which this Author produces, and the Objects to which he would apply them. From this Apprehension of being too minute, I have here omitted the Argument at large, which originally made a Part of this Discourse, and which may possibly appear at some other Time, and in a more particular Discussion concerning the Policy of our Colonies.

But why should we resort to foreign Countries and remote Times, for Examples, when we have all the proper Means of Information at Home, and as it were immediately under our Eyes? Can it not be proved, that it is by no Means the Extent of our Colonies into the  
Inland

Inland Parts, which has caused the increased Consumption of our Manufactures in *North America*, but the Increase in the maritime Parts, and near the navigable Rivers, the Benefit of which cannot extend very far. Goods produced beyond the Blue Mountains must, in their Way to our northern Sea Ports, first ascend the Streams, that fall from the western Sides of these Mountains; and then, in descending the Streams, which fall from the eastern Sides, must, from the many Rifts and Falls in those Streams, be so often unloaded and reloaded, that we can entertain no Hopes of seeing at our Markets any raw heavy Commodities raised in those Countries; yet such alone are the Commodities which those Countries could raise, or which our Policy would suffer to be transported from thence to a foreign Market.

Let us not amuse ourselves with vain Speculations! As far as the Profits of *Indian Trade* extend, so far, and no further, the *Tramontine Colonist* may deal with us. When this Fund is exhausted, they can no longer be useful to us; they must manufacture for themselves, or they must degenerate into Savages. The Surplus of a rude new Agriculture, to be transported under every possible Disadvantage, can be no Ballance for Manufactures which have had the last Hand, and are to be sent to them under all the same Disadvantages.

The Author of the *Interest* may have heard something of the State of the Settlers, especially the back Settlers in *Pensylvania*. “*They*  
“*manufacture,*

“*manufacture, says* \* Douglas, *perhaps nine Parts in ten of all they wear.*” They make Linen even for Exportation. The most distant of those People live at no very great Distance from the Sea, they are extremely industrious and frugal; and yet, with all their Agriculture and Manufacture, and with all their Frugality and Industry, they are none of them in a very opulent Condition. They are indeed far from culpable; it is their Situation alone that is to be blamed. But were we willing to admit all, and more than he urges in Favour of this hypothetical inland Commerce, in the Name of Heaven what Argument does this furnish for the Necessity of keeping *Canada*? These *Ohio* Countries never composed any Part of *Canada*; nor was any Part of *Nova Scotia* included in it. Is it for want of Territory that he is pleased to claim *Canada*? Our old Possessions, and our recovered Rights in *North America*, contain Land for raising Hemp and raw Silk sufficient, not only for our own Market, but equal to what is exported in the Course of Trade from and to all the Parts of the known World. These old Possessions and recovered Rights, independent of *Canada*, contain a Territory extending on the Coast upwards of 1500 Miles in Length, and in many Places 600 within Land. A Territory as large as *France*, *Spain* and *Germany* taken together, and much more than

\* Vid. Douglas's *North America*, pag. 332. vol. ii. N.B. This is a *North American* Writer.

than sufficient for the Support of at least thirty Millions of Inhabitants, possibly as many Subjects as our Prudence ought to desire, because they are as many as our Strength will enable us to govern. Notwithstanding this immense Extent of Territory, to hear this Writer, one would imagine, we were confined to some pitiful Rock of a few Acres, and stifled for want of Elbow Room :

*Æstuat infelix angusto limite Mundi,*

*Ut Gyari clausus scopulis, parvaque Scripbo.*

To conclude this Point, I think three Things very evident; first, that Inland Colonies can never prove in any considerable Degree beneficial to our Commerce; secondly, that, independent of *Canada*, we have Land more than sufficient for every Sort of Product, which the most sanguine Schemist can imagine; and lastly, that if we were deficient in Extent of Territory, yet *Canada* proper lies in a Climate absolutely incapable of furnishing any one of the Commodities they pretend to raise. And just to add a Word further, let the Reader recollect that, allowing all they say to be probable, it is built on Ideas merely speculative, and not supported by a single existing Fact.

I pass then from the Consideration of *Canada* as an Establishment of Profit, to consider its Value as an Establishment of Defence; for this Writer does not speak of *Canada* so much as an useful Acquisition, as an Acquisition absolutely necessary; he does not say that without this Country we should have a weaker Security, but that without it, our Colonies

can have no Security at all. This Proposition he is pleased to assert in all the wild Latitude of the Writer whose Advocate he is. Let us see how he supports it.

In order to shew, that nothing less than the intire Possession of *Canada* could provide for the Security of our Colonies in *North America*, it was necessary he should have first shewn that they were in Danger, because the Extent and Nature of the Security must always depend on the Nature and Extent of the Danger.

This Point, one would think, in every Argument, which but pretended to Regularity, should have been first solidly established; so far were they however from producing a Danger sufficient to justify this extravagant Alarm which they had raised, that the Author of the *Interest* opens his Cause by admitting, that in Fact we are not exposed to any Danger of Moment; because he confesses that \* “in *North America* we are a far greater continental  
“ as well as naval Power than *France*; and  
“ that only Cowardice or Ignorance can subject  
“ our Colonies there to a *French* Conquest.”

On what Ground therefore does he build his System of the absolute indispensable Necessity of this Acquisition of all *Canada*? Why, upon a Distinction! he distinguishes Security, and consequently Danger, into three Kinds; the first Security is that from Conquest, from all Apprehensions of which you see he is pleased to relieve us; the second Security is that from Molestation  
by



by Savages; the third is a Security from another *American War*.

The second Point is that which he principally labours. He observes, and very justly, that the *American Savages* make War not like Armies, but like Robbers; that Forts are no more Security against their Incurfions, than the † Tower of *London* is against Highwaymen, and that they will be incited to these Incurfions, and consequently that our Colonies cannot have this Security, as long as the *French* have any footing in *North America*.

But notwithstanding the important, and terrible Light, in which these scattered Gangs of Robbers are represented by some of our political Writers, the best informed amongst these Writers, as well as the loudest on this very Topic, has been pleased to furnish us with such Facts, as prove demonstrably that the *Indians* have never been able materially to check the Population, or to impair the Commerce, of our most exposed Colonies. For he has shewn that the People of these Colonies, independent of foreign Recruits, double themselves in twenty-five Years. The most undisturbed Tranquility could not have been productive of a greater Population; and I much doubt whether we have an Example of any thing like it in any other Part of the Globe.

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† Int. Col. p. 12. “ *Long Experience has taught our Planters that they cannot rely on Forts as Security against Indians. The Inhabitants of Hackney might as well rely upon the Tower of London to secure them against Highwaymen and House-breakers.*”

This he has shewn to be the State of Population in the Colonies before the War, and he has not told us that it has suffered any considerable Alteration since. On this Point he gives us nothing particular. But, to make amends, he has shewn that with regard to their Trade, the savage War, far from having put them back, has not been able to keep them at a Stand, or to prevent their advancing to a very sudden, and very extraordinary Pitch of Prosperity. He has shewn that these Colonies from the Year 1755 to the Year 1758, (the very Period of these savage Incurfions) have increased in their Import Trade much more than in any three Years of the profoundest Peace ; nor has their Export lessened, it has rather improved.

These Facts prove beyond all Contradiction, either that these remote back Settlements suffered very little in the War, or that their Suffering can very little affect the commercial Prosperity of our continental Colonies. I do not by any means attribute this Prosperity to that Suffering. It is clear that this Augmentation of their Trade is solely owing to the War, the most lucrative Event that ever happened to *America*. In the last Year 500,000 *l.* in Specie was remitted to *North America*, for extraordinary Services. But it is equally clear, that the Destruction of the back Settlements has not been able to prevent the War from operating most amazingly in their Favour ; and whatever may be said of the *Indian Cruelties*,  
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(and they are certainly terrible) if we set the Advantages of their Trade in Peace, against their Cruelties in Time of War, it will be found that this People have on the whole rather contributed to extend our Settlements into the remote Countries, than to restrain them ; and I can scarce conceive, supposing it a Matter of more Consideration to us than it is, how our Colonies in this Time could, if no such People had existed, have extended themselves much beyond their present Limits, the maritime Parts being naturally first peopled.

I shall however permit these Gentlemen to lay what Weight they will upon this Danger ; and even contrary to Truth, suppose the Danger not to be reciprocal to us and to the *French*. But then it becomes incumbent on them to shew, that, by their Scheme of possessing all *Canada*, they will provide the necessary Security they have always contended for. On this, which is the Affirmative, the material, Part of the Question, and the true Point of the Argument, they have absolutely quitted the Field, after having advanced no further than, and indeed scarce so far as to, a naked Assertion.

They advanced no further, however surprising it may seem, for a very good Reason. They saw plainly enough that, if the greatest and most decided Superiority could be considered as a Security, we had that Security even  
before

before the War †; they saw that, by the Establishment of our just Limits in *Nova Scotia*, on the *Ohio*, and the Lakes, without at all including *French Canada*, that Security would have been at least doubled; and that we should have been put into Possession of every strong and important Pass in *North America*. They saw all this, and were sensible, at the same time, that, in order to prove the Necessity, of acquiring *Canada*, they had been obliged to lay down a Principle of Security, to which the Acquisition of *Canada* would be full as inadequate as the very System they condemned: their Principle was, that whilst the *French* bordered on us in any Part, we could enjoy no Security. Had they attempted therefore to shew the Affirmative Part, that *Canada* was an effectual Provision against this Danger, they knew they must resort to those very Arguments, which they had all along opposed, and that the Weakness of their Scheme would appear at the very first Glance, unless they could prove that *Canada* was all *North America*, for on no other Supposition was *their Security* to be had. They therefore thought it safer intirely to evade this Discussion, though they had been expressly challenged to it; hoping that the Publick would take it for granted, that

† The strange Positions, advanced on this matter, render it necessary to remind the Reader that it was not the *Danger* of our Colonies, but the Encroachments on our Rights which occasioned the War. Rights, which however remote or inconsiderable, it would not have suited the Dignity of our Crown tamely to have seen invaded; but no publick Act mentioned, and no private Man of Sense ever thought of Danger.

that those, who had shewed themselves so extremely alarmed at the Danger of the Colonies as to forget every other Consideration, had been wise enough to provide effectually for their Security. No Person living having therefore said a single Word in Proof of this Proposition, that *Canada* really gave the Security, they required ; and it being, I am very sure, far enough from self-evident, I might be supposed exempted from the Trouble of a Refutation. But in order to give an intire Satisfaction to the Reader, I shall intreat his Patience a little longer on this Point.

The great Stress of the Argument is laid, as he will observe, upon our Danger from the savage \* Incurfions, and here it is proper that those, who have not very attentively studied the Affairs of *America*, should be apprised, that our Colonies in common with the Colonies of all other *European* Nations, those of *Spain*, *Portugal*, and *Holland*, have from their first Settlement been liable to some Molestation from the aboriginal Savages of that Country. This is an Inconvenience to which such Colonies are, and ever must in some Degree be subject, as long as those savage Nations continue to exist ; and no Measures whatever can effectually remove it.

But if it is proper that this Inconvenience should be fairly laid before the Reader, it is no less proper that he should be informed of other Particulars equally true ; first, that the Danger to us from these Incurfions is by no Means

\* Vid. Int. Col. p. 5. et passim.



Means so great as these Writers affect to represent ; nor have the *French Indians* been uniformly noxious to us and useful to the *French*. On the contrary, we have sometimes made these very Savages extremely useful to us against the *French* ; and we have more than once, by means of these very Savages, brought the *French Colony of Canada* to the very Brink of Destruction. And, Secondly, That be the Danger of what Magnitude they please, they have never shewn that *Canada* will prove any sort of Security against the Danger from the *Indians*.

With regard to the first Point, some peculiar and striking Manners, an odd and singular Mode of Expression in their Harangues, some horrid Cruelties in their Way of making War, have rendered the Affairs of those People more affecting to us, than their real Importance in the *American System* at all deserves. The savage Manners strike powerfully on the Imagination, and are therefore an excellent Instrument in the Hands of designing People. I know that the unhappy Sufferers by the *Indian* Barbarity are worthy of great Compassion ; but I know too, that this Compassion ought not to pervert our Judgment, or alarm us out of all common Sense and all rational Consideration of our Interest. Notwithstanding the tremendous Accounts which have from Time to Time filled our News Papers, on the best Information I have been able to derive from a very diligent Enquiry, the Damage done in *North America*, in comparison of the Terror it

has occasioned, has been altogether trifling. An *Indian* Enemy, the Novelty once removed, is as contemptible for his Weakness as he is odious for his Cruelty ; and it might be easily proved, that all the People killed from one End of *America* to the other, in these savage Excursions, before the current Year, did not amount to the Number slain in one sharp Skirmish in *Germany* ; such a Skirmish as for the Loss of it they would have shewn no kind of publick Concern here at *London*, or for the Advantage in which we should not light a single Window.

But this so dreaded Race of Men, to the Consideration of whom we are to postpone all our other Interest, are not only extremely divided, and many of them actually fighting for us, but they are even now only few in Number. Our Traders wage a most destructive and uninterrupted War on them in the Commerce of Spirituous Liquors, by which they severely retaliate all the Murder which the Barbarity of the Savages instigates them to commit. Thus by their Vices, their Ignorance, their inconvenient Manner of Life, and their Cruelty, which is not executed solely upon their *European* Neighbours, they are so extremely reduced and decay so prodigiously (I had almost said incredibly) fast, that it is probable in half a Century they must disappear from the Neighbourhood of our Colonies. Truly it is curious enough to observe, that when these People were ten times more numerous than they are at present, and in every Respect more terrible, the Inhabitants of our Colonies,

at that Time comparatively very few, always spoke and wrote of them, with the greatest Contempt ; and now, when the *Indians* as well as the *French* are greatly reduced, when the very Country, which some of the most dreaded of those Nations inhabit, was, on the Terms of our original Right, to be put into our Hands to fortify as we pleased, then all of a sudden the Colonies are represented as in the utmost Terror and Consternation. Then they are exposed to Burnings, Wastings, and Murders of Men, Women, and Children, and we have done absolutely nothing for them while the *French* possess *Canada*.

I am, however, willing for Argument, to admit the Power of these pitiful Savages to be as great as the Gentlemen please ; to allow, that, in spite of our strong Establishment in their Country, they will continually and unanimously persevere in the *French* Interest. I will suppose that they have so little of Wisdom or of human Nature, that they will pertinaciously court an unfortunate and ruinous Alliance. Yet if the Plan proposed by these Gentlemen will deliver them from the Fear which they pretend ; if their Demands, extensive as they are, will come up in any Degree to their Principles ; I am very ready at once to adopt their Scheme. On this Point, I am willing to join Issue, and here to rest the whole Controversy.

And first, I must observe, that the ingenious Author of the *Interest* has nowhere attempted to prove, that, in Case the *French* were wholly removed not only out of *Canada*, but out of the World ; we should be thereby

thereby secured from the Ravages and Incursions of the *Indians*. He knows too well that these People have many Motives and Inducements to War, independent of the Influence of *French* Politicks; and he is too well versed in our Colony History, not to remember that we have been engaged in many of our greatest *Indian* Wars, at Times when we had no Reason to suspect, that the *Indian* Hostilities were at all provoked by *French* Councils.

This Writer is so fully satisfied of the Insufficiency of the Cession of *Canada* to guard against the only Danger he is pleased to alledge, that he is obliged to fly to that very Security, the absolute Insufficiency of which he had before so positively, and, indeed, so very justly asserted; and he contends that we must even maintain \*Forts and Garrisons to awe the *Indians*, though *Canada* should be yielded to us.

I would beseech those, who take Pains to exaggerate Disorders which they know to be incurable, with intent to recommend political Nostrums which they know to be insufficient, to recollect, that whenever *Canada* becomes a *British* Colony, it becomes from that Moment intitled to our Care and Protection, as much as any other of our Settlements; to recollect that the remote *English* Settlers in our Colony of *Canada*, will also be exposed as much or more than any of the rest, on its immensely extended Frontier, to the Attacks of hundreds of savage Nations, to very many of which we have

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been

\* Vid. Int. of Col. p. 13. "I would not be understood to deny that, if we retain *Canada*, some few Forts will be of use."

been hitherto Strangers, and against which this Country of *Canada*, when it was in the Hands of *France*, was some sort of Outwork to us. Some of these Nations may probably be under the Influence of the *French*, some under that of the *Spaniards*, others under an Influence perhaps still more dangerous, their own particular Ambition, their own Resentment, or their own savage Caprice. So that the boasted Remedy has only shifted the Seat, and by no Means removed the Cause, of the Distemper.

Besides, let us not forget, that a great Part of our old Colonies, a great Part of *Virginia*, the two *Carolinas*, and *Georgia*, are in themselves much the weakest, and much the most valuable, of all our Colonies on that Continent, and are bordered by much the strongest of the savage Tribes; the ten Nations on the *Ohio*, those of the *Creeks*, and the *Cherokees*, *Chicasaws*, *Chaetaws*, whom we know to have been not at all intimidated by the Reduction of all *Canada*, from carrying on a cruel, and, for some time, successful War against us. Thus we have been furnished with a striking Proof of the Insufficiency of this fantastical Hypothesis, almost as soon as it was published.

There is another Sort of Security mentioned by this Writer of the *Interest*, the Security of never having another *American War*. A Security with which he may, without any Disturbance from me, amuse himself, and those who chuse to be diverted with this Kind of Speculations. But those, who reason from Experience,



Experience, and consider from what Causes this last *American War* arose, will laugh at such an absurd Expectation. Whoever examines the Answer of \* *England* to the *Ultimatum* of *France*, will see that the new Bounds of *Canada* will admit of as many Discussions, whenever the *French* shall chuse to enter into them, as our old Bounds in *Nova Scotia*, and on the *Ohio*, and that, independent of all these Difficulties, the real Limits of our Southern Colonies are yet further from an accurate Adjustment than those of our Northern.

There is nothing more painful than to be driven to maintain an Argument, where you have Reason to think your Antagonist is not quite serious. After all this Reasoning, does this Gentleman seriously, or does any Man whatever in good Earnest believe, that if the *French*, broken as they have been in this War, were in the Conclusion of it confined within the real Bounds of *Canada*, and that we possessed the whole vast Country of *Nova Scotia*, and all the Country of *Ohio*, that our Colonies could be in any real Danger from the Attempts of the *French*? Does he not on the contrary believe, or rather is he not fully convinced, that the true and real Danger would lie wholly upon the Side of the *French*; and that on breaking out of a War between the two  
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\* N<sup>o</sup> 28. *Fr. Hist Mem.* Art. 2. "As to what respects the Line drawn from Rio per dido, with regard to the Limits of Louisiana, his Majesty is obliged to reject it." And again in the next Page, "The Line proposed to fix the Bounds of Louisiana cannot be admitted."

Crowns, they must be subject not only to some Degree of Molestation, but to utter Ruin from ours; that the Attack would be most probably from us, and that the *French* would in any such War gladly compound for a Neutrality?

But this being a Sort of Consideration not much pushed by the Writers, and addressed only to the Politicks of the most uninformed Vulgar, I shall not insist upon it.

In a Word, the Security derived from an irresistible Superiority, it is on all Hands admitted we might have had, without *Canada*, the Security against all Possibility of an Invasion, we have not with *Canada*, in its utmost Extent, and a Security on the extravagant Principles, on which *Canada* was claimed by all the Writers for it, which was in Effect nothing less than, that we should have no Neighbours, we neither could have with *Canada*, and *Louisiana*, nor with all *America*, nor indeed with any thing short of universal Empire. The Foundations upon which these Writers built their System, were laid in the most unbounded, and unbecoming Ambition. The Value of the Demands they made in Consequence of those extravagant Principles, was pitiful, and ridiculously low, and such as provided for no one national Advantage of the least Importance. Theirs was just the Reverse of an intelligent Policy, in which, the Pretences ought to be as moderate, and the Acquisitions as advantageous as possible.

I must repeat the Caution I used at the Beginning of this Part of my Discourse: I  
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do not propose that *Canada* should not be acquired, I only propose that the real Value of this Acquisition should be known. The *French* have made no Difficulty of surrendering all *Canada*. I am heartily glad (though I am no Way surpris'd) that they did not; because it puts an End to a Dispute, in which Passion on one Side would have been heavy enough to have over-ballanced any Weight of Reason on the other. *Canada* may be of some Advantage to us. I must confess I do not know what that Advantage is. But whatever it may be, I conceive we have paid the full Price for it, not only in Regard to the Value of the Objects exchanged, but also in Regard to the Situation of those Objects, at the Time of the Exchange.

The Equivalent which *France* demanded for her Guarantee of *Canada* was a Participation in the two *North American Fisheries*: that on the Banks of *Newfoundland*, and that in the Gulph of *St. Lawrence*. It must be observed, that these are two distinct Fisheries: and that they are always considered as distinct in our Memorials \*.

Either of those Fisheries, merely as an Object of Value, and wholly independent of its Situation at the opening this Treaty (when, as the Reader may observe, they were both in our Possession) would I believe generally have pass'd as a very sufficient Indemnification for *Canada*. But we admitted the Proposal of *France* for both of these Fisheries; annexing only the Condition of her

\* N<sup>o</sup> 28. Art. 4. Hist. Mem. of the Neg.

her destroying the Harbour of *Dunkirk* conformably to the Treaties of *Utrecht* and *Aix la Chapelle*. Even with this Condition, I apprehend, the Bargain was still infinitely in the Favour of *France*. Whether the Concession was very mortifying to them as they asserted, I know not, nor do I think that their Feelings constitute any Part of our Interest. They certainly lost very little by that Condition: and I think it is as certain that we have gained nothing by it.

Because *first* \*, they did not agree to destroy the trading Harbour, which was included in their Obligation under the ninth Article of the Treaty of *Utrecht*.

*Secondly*, they refused to erect a Dam † against the Sea; a Work to which they had been obliged after the Peace abovementioned, and without which the Harbour cannot be destroyed.

*Thirdly*, they insisted that the ‡ Cunette should be left standing to preserve the Health of the Inhabitants, which was exactly the Pretence upon which they before evaded the intire Demolition of that Harbour under the Treaty of *Utrecht* ||.

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\* N<sup>o</sup> 27. Fr. Hist. Mem. Art. 4. "*His Majesty will leave the trading Harbour.*" And Vid. Occasional Writer, Case of *Dunkirk* considered, p. 195, and 300.

† Pag. 59. of Fr. Hist. Mem. and Pag. 312, 319, 322, of the Occasional Writer.

‡ No. 29. Art. 4. Fr. Hist. Mem. "*But the Cunette shall be left standing round the Place for the Salubrity of the Air.*"

|| Vid. 301, 2. Occasional Writer.

The Harbour of *Dunkirk* would therefore have been only nominally destroyed. But whether it was to be destroyed nominally or really is, it is now apparent, a Matter of little Consequence; but I think our again making a Point of it, after having in two Treaties experienced the Inefficacy of such Stipulations, was not a Matter of Indifference; but in many Respects a most unfortunate Measure. This Part of the Treaty, instead of settling any thing, will only give rise to daily and hourly Discussions; and it has opened an inexhaustible Source of Contention, the inevitable Consequence of which must be, either a shameful renouncing of a national Point, or the involving us in a new War for an insignificant Object.

If we had consulted our Reason, we must have known that no People will ever execute faithfully, the total Destruction of one of their own Places, when the Execution depends wholly upon themselves, when the Place remains in their own Possession, and when they have received their Consideration, previous to the Performance on their Side; and if we had consulted Experience, we should have seen that this has been hitherto exactly the Case of *France* with Regard to *Dunkirk*, notwithstanding the express Stipulations in two Treaties, that of *Utrecht* and that of *Aix la Chapelle*. But what has rendered our admitting this Sort of Demolition among the Equivalents peculiarly unfortunate is, that when the



*French* have found that *Dunkirk* forms so leading a Part in our System of Politicks, they will (as it is always in their Power) by putting forward or by suspending this Work, by pretended Demolitions, and by real Establishments of their Harbour, continually play upon our Passions, and in the same Manner as they have now, they will for the future oblige us to purchase the same ineffectual Stipulation by the Cession of some Object of real Importance.

After we have deducted the Demolition of *Dunkirk*, (the Value of which the Reader may judge) all the Remainder of the Equivalent, which the *French* paid for the two Fisheries, consisted only in the Guarantee of *Canada*. This Equivalent, (contrary to the Basis of the Treaty) came *not out of her uti possidetis but out of ours*, that is, in other Words, she purchased our Possessions with our Money.

If *France* indeed had been in Possession of all *Canada*, instead of being driven from every Part of it, and we Masters only of the Fisheries of *Newfoundland* and *St. Lawrence*; if in this Situation we had admitted her to a Participation of these Fisheries in Exchange for *Canada*, I ask whether any fair Arbitrator would not have considered it as a Bargain extremely advantageous to *France*?

But when we were indisputably Masters both of the one, and the other of these Objects; and by the fundamental Principle of the Treaty laid down by *France* herself, were obliged to yield none of *our* Possessions, for  
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which a Compensation was not to be made from *hers*; if then we admitted her to take the Fisheries which were in our Possession, in Compensation for *Canada*, which was also in our Possession, would not (I won't say any Arbitrator, but would not) any Advocate for *France*, admit our Proceeding to be governed by a Spirit of Generosity hitherto unexampled in the Dealings between Nation and Nation?

Having in this Manner settled the *North American* Account (upon her own Principles) wholly to her Advantage, would it have been inconsistent with the loftiest Dignity on the Side of *France*, or the most diffident Humility on ours, would it have shocked any reasonable, decent, or conciliatory Principle, if we were to have asked in our Turn some Advantage, in some of the Equivalents, in some one Part or other of the World? Might not this Plan have been proposed; that they should take *Belleisle* for *Minorca*? That we should have given them, what they required, and it was not an unreasonable Request, *Senegal* or *Goree*, for their *German* Conquests; and when we permitted them to retain *St. Lucie*, which tho' comprehended in their *uti possidetis* was our Right, ought not they to have permitted us in our Turn to retain *Guadaloupe*? And if this did not seem to them a just Equivalent; if we had added to the Cession of *St. Lucie*, the rest of the neutral Islands (which to them might be of some Advantage) could the *French* Negotiator himself pretend to deny, that as in *North America* we had acted a very generous, so in the *West-Indies* we acted

at least a very moderate Part? Could he say that we had quitted the Basis of the Negotiation, but when the quitting of it was clearly to the Advantage of *France*? Surely he could never say, with any Appearance of Truth, that we assumed a despotic Air, that we spoke in the Tone of Conquerors, or that we had made any harsh offensive Use of our Victories; and yet this System, so respectable for its Moderation, would not have cost us one Penny of Trade or of Revenue. It would have satisfied the Partizans both of *North American*, and *West-Indian* Acquisition, and the Day the Peace was concluded, it would have added to our *English* and *North American* Trade, a Source of Wealth cheaply valued at a Million a Year. Let the Reader compare the Effect of this Scheme with that stated in the sixtieth Page of this Treatise.

I know not by what Fatality it is, but I scarce remember a Treaty which has been in any considerable Degree advantageous to this Nation, except that with *Spain* in 1670, by which our Right to *Jamaica* was confirmed. By that Treaty we possess at this Day a Trade worth within a Trifle of Eleven hundred thousand Pounds a Year. The Peace of *Utrecht* was certainly a bad one, compared with the Advantages which we might reasonably have expected. Yet even this Treaty was not wholly un lucrative to the Nation; for we acquired by that Treaty one half of the small Island of *St. Christopher*. The Sale of Lands in that half  
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of the Island produced 90,000 l. which came to the Credit of the Nation, and appears upon the public Accounts ; a Sum ten times greater than all the Possessions we should have retained in the late Treaty would have paid us in a Century. To say nothing of the Trade of that Part of the Island, which is worth above 104,000 l. annually ; whereas the Trade of all our intended Acquisitions in 1761, if compared with the Charge of keeping them, is a good deal worse than nothing.

I am far from thinking that no Sacrifices ought to be made to the general Peace of *Europe*. No Man, I believe, is inhuman or unpolitic enough to advance so cruel an Absurdity ; but because we are to make some Sacrifice, are we carefully to select for that Sacrifice the fairest and fattest of all our Flock ? the only Object we had acquired during the War, which we are positively able to say is of the least commercial Benefit to us ? And is *France*, to whom Peace is probably as necessary as it is to us, is *France* to make no Sacrifice on her Side, but of Objects which she must confess, and which we know are no way beneficial to her ? The Events of War are in themselves of very little Consequence. The Victors and the Vanquished are nearly equal Losers both in Men and Treasure. The Terms of Peace are what discriminate the Fortune of contending Nations ; and whoever may have won the Battles, those only, have the Advantage of the War, whose Resources after it, are the largest, and the most entire ;  
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and I defy any Man to shew one Instance in which that Plan of Peace, which we have examined, would have added one Penny to ours, or have detracted one Penny from the Resources of *France*.

And here, I hope, it will not be thought assuming, that I take the Liberty humbly, but earnestly, to recommend it to the serious Consideration of our Superiors, whether at the End of a glorious indeed, but most expensive War, which has laid so heavy a Burthen upon our Revenue, and our Credit, it ought not to be one Object, at least, of our Attention, to find in our Conquests something which might enable us to lessen, or to bear the enormous Weight of our Debt. The very just Dread of increasing which yet further, when we have added nothing to our Resources, may one day be a Means of binding down our victorious Arms; and may even disable, or at least dishearten us, from the Vindication of our justest, and most important Rights. And I would submit it, with all due Deference, to better Judgments, whether we ought not to deliberate a little, before we venture to throw out of our Hands an Acquisition worth at this Moment above 600,000 l. a Year to our direct *British* Trade; and whether we ought to think ourselves sufficiently indemnified for the Expence of this very chargeable War, by speculative Projects of Commerce, in Places which never enjoyed any Trade; and by Speculations for Security in Places, which were never in any Danger.



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## POSTSCRIPT.

**T**HE foregoing Examination is confined to the State of Affairs during the Period of the first Negotiation. Of the Plan, which is pursued in the present, the Author professes himself totally ignorant ; but, whether his Reasonings are invalidated or strengthened by the Events, which have happened since the Period he treats of, he submits without any new Argument to the Reader's Judgment, thinking that Matter tolerably evident.

A great Part of the Negotiation, which is the Subject of the foregoing Discourse, turned upon Equivalents and Exchanges. It became therefore necessary to examine, with Attention, into the real Value of the several Objects, which, on that Occasion, had been ballanced against each other ; and he did not think this Examination had been made, at least in any Piece he had the Fortune to see, so fully and so accurately, as the Subject seemed to require. In the Memorials, by which the late Negotiation was carried on, the Equivalents are sometimes so confounded and huddled together, that it is not always easy to discern, what  
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particular Object is set against another ; but the original Proposals of the Duke *de Choiseul* to our Minister at *Paris*, and the Recapitulation at the End of the Historical Memorial, enable us to decompound this mixed Mass, and to see the Value, which was set upon each distinct Object.

The Author has had frequent Occasion to mention some political Writers ; but, in opposing their Sentiments, he has not shewn any personal Disrespect. He entertains the highest Opinion of their Parts, though he cannot forbear thinking, that, from a Misconception of the true Merits of the Question, they have for some time contributed extremely to mislead the public Opinion ; and he hopes the Reader will remark one Thing in his Favour. Diffident of his own, and warned by the ill Success of much greater, Abilities, he has not ventured to entertain him with any political or commercial Speculations ; for he will never allow those Opinions to be called Speculations, which he supports by present existing Facts, by Custom-house Entries, and other the most authentic Vouchers ; these he gives in the Detail, and every Reader of common Sense, and common Attention, is capable of forming a Judgment upon them ; and he desires to be heard no longer than while he speaks from them. He hopes in return that the Public will

will not admit as Answers to his Facts any loose unsupported Reasonings, however ingenious they may be ; nor permit the State of the Question to be changed, or one Thing substituted for another. If such Practices had never been admitted in the Discussion of this Question, he is convinced the Public could never have been diverted from the ancient fundamental Maxims of *British* Policy ; Maxims to which we owe all our present Prosperity, and the Attention to which at this great Crisis, must determine no contemptible Part of *Great Britain's* future Fortune and Importance.

If, notwithstanding the Corrections, which the Favour of the Public has given the Author an Opportunity of making, in a second Edition, any Inaccuracies still remain, it is hoped that such a Misfortune will be considered as almost unavoidable, in the Management of an Argument upon so very comprehensive a Subject in so narrow a Compass. This, however, he thinks he may still assert, that no Mistakes, which he may have fallen into, can in the least tend to invalidate his Reasonings : Quite otherwise ; his Omissions are far more numerous than his Mistakes ; and these Omissions consist in his not having pushed to their full Extent the Advantages with which his Facts supplied him.

In stating the particular Value of *Guadaloupe*, he has been no less defective in  
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many Things, which might tend to set the Importance of that Acquisition in its proper Light : For an Instance of this, he begs Leave to lay before the Reader a comparative View of the Trade of that Island, even in the imperfect State in which it stood immediately after its Reduction, and that of one of our most flourishing Colonies of *North America*, immediately before the breaking out of the present War. The Colony of *Pensilvania* is of such Reputation, that he would deservedly pass for little better than a Madman, who should deny or endeavour to diminish the Idea of its Importance. It is indeed a Country of very great Extent ; one of the most opulent, populous, and growing of all our northern Establishments ; and cannot contain less than 200,000 Whites. This Colony in the Year 1752 took off the Value of 201,666*l.* 1*9s.* 11*d.* in Merchandizes from *England*. This Demand is certainly sufficient to establish *Pensilvania* in our Opinions as a very great commercial Object ; but compare this Demand of *Pensilvania*, after eighty Years Settlement, with that of *Guadaloupe* in its most imperfect State, in the Interim between its being a Conquest and a Colony ; in this Point of Time the Demand for *British* Commodities in *Guadaloupe* amounted to 238,000 *l.*

Now if you compare the Demand for *British* Commodities with the Number of Inhabitants in each of these Countries, *Pensylvania* does

does not take off much above the Value of 20*s.* a Head ; whereas the Inhabitants of *Guadaloupe*, supposing the Whites to be 10,000, take off above 23*l.* Sterling for each Person.

Upon this comparative View of their respective Demands from *Great Britain* ; on what Principle can *Pensilvania* be considered as an Object of very great and serious Importance to our Power and Commerce, as in common Reason it must be, if *Guadaloupe* is not to be considered at least on a Par with it ; and in every commercial Light an Object of as much Importance. This is the State, upon the respective Demands of these two Countries from *Great Britain*, in which *Guadaloupe* is not inferior, but rather superior to the great Colony of *Pensilvania*. But on a comparative View of their respective Exports hither, the Ballance is infinitely in Favour of *Guadaloupe*; the Export of the former to *Great Britain* is but 22,404*l.* 13*s.* 1*d.* that of the latter, as we have seen, amounts to 630,269*l.* 2*s.* 9*d.* above five and twenty Times the Value of that of *Pensilvania*.

In this View of Export to *Great Britain*, the Reader will take another comparative View. The Export of all the Colonies on the Continent which do not produce enumerated Commodities, and which are the only ones truly contrasted with the *West-Indies*, amounts to only 70,074*l.* 12*s.* 3*d.* The Reader has just seen how little proportioned this is to that of *Guadaloupe* alone.



But to carry this still further, the whole Produce of all the *North American* Colonies put together, amounts but to 648,683 *l. os. 4d.* which is but 18,413 *l. 11 s. 4 d.* more than the Returns of *Guadaloupe* alone.

F I N I S.







